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 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the United Nations (UN), an institution that was 
established to operate as an apolitical, administrative body that would, above all other obligations, 
maintain international peace and security. This thesis will primarily focus on the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), which has been given the supreme power to “determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”1 and may also “take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”2  The permanent members of the UNSC, who individually each enjoy the power to veto 
decisions made by the Council, are: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States 
(P5). There are also ten non-permanent members of the UNSC, who are elected for a rotational two-
year term from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which comprises all 193 member 
states of the UN.   
 Seventy years after the UN’s establishment, calls for reform of the system are more 
prevalent than ever; the Restrain the Veto campaign led by France and Mexico, for example, is “one 
of the most visible and fast-spreading social media campaigns in the UN’s history,”3 and is 
interestingly spearheaded by a P5 member. The publicity and traction of this campaign alone 
illustrates that Council reform is very much a live and topical issue.  Yet, calls for reform are nothing 
new. Various proposals for change have been presented and deliberated ever since the UN first 
convened in 1946. Over the last 70 years, world leaders, academics, and political commentators 
have consistently decried the Council’s numerous disappointments.  Perceived UNSC failings range 
from its inability to act during genocides in places such Rwanda, Darfur, and Srebrenica; the child sex 
scandals of UN Peacekeepers; its inability to prevent nuclear proliferation; and inaction in 
contemporary cases of civil war, such as in Syria and Yemen. The Council’s inability to take action in 
the face of these failings is due, in part, to the deadlock made possible by the permanent members’ 
veto privilege. Furthermore, the ability of the powerful P5 members to override the Council and 
wage war under the guise of humanitarian intervention and the right to self defence has arguably 
undermined the perception of the Council as a neutral and impartial arbitrator, and thus its 
credibility in the international arena.  
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 Interestingly, the term ‘veto’ is mentioned nowhere in the UN Charter. Instead, it is 
disguised in Article 27(3) where it is stated that on all non-procedural matters the Council must 
secure an “affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members.”4 However, it does not stipulate the requirement of affirmative votes of all permanent 
states. A permanent member may choose to abstain, and when it does, it does not equate to a 
negative vote, therefore not all permanent members need to strictly vote on a decision.  No 
explanation is required should a permanent member chose to exercise the veto, although 
statements are often made at meetings regarding the debated resolution. These non-permanent 
members do not receive the power to veto decisions made by the UNSC. From the outset of the UN 
Charter negotiations in 1945, many UN founding member states voiced their vehement opposition 
to the gifting of the power of the veto to the P5 members. Some of the founding members, including 
New Zealand, forewarned of the risks involved.  New Zealand Prime Minister at the time, Peter 
Fraser, argued that the veto could end up acting as a “cloak of protection” for the P5 and their 
allies.5  
 States that call for the reform of the UNSC, and in particular the removal of the veto 
privilege, often use the annual gathering of the world leaders at the United Nations General 
Assembly General Debate to voice their positions. In his 2013 UNGA address, New Zealand Prime 
Minister John Key declared that “the UN has too often failed to provide solutions to the problems 
the world expects it to resolve. The gap between aspiration and delivery is all too apparent, as the 
situation in Syria has again so brutally reminded us.”6  Again, in his 2015 UNGA address, Key stated 
that “The conflicts and human suffering in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan and a long list of other 
countries, show how far we are from achieving the aspirations of our founders and of today’s 
members.”7  
 It is the aspirations of the founders, in particular, the goal of political neutrality, which this 
thesis seeks to explore.  It will argue that current expectations of the Council are in need of 
reconsideration and that the limitations of political neutrality need to be addressed and 
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acknowledged in order for the institution to hold any credibility. This thesis will question whether 
political neutrality in the UNSC is a desirable outcome, and secondly whether it is even possible.  
 
 The concept of a politically neutral UN is manifested clearly within Article 40 of the UN 
Charter where it states: 
 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the 
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties 
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such 
provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties 





However, there is clear evidence of situations where the UN has indeed applied provisional 
measures that do prejudice the rights, claim, or position of parties concerned, contrary to the 
provision of the Charter. On the surface, it is understandable that the UN would strive towards 
political neutrality.  The perception of a neutral body is a necessary feature of any situation which 
requires fair and just mediation, let alone for an organisation that is charged with the responsibility 
of maintaining international peace and security. Yet, an in-depth analysis of the action of the UNSC 
reveals that for members outside of the P5, neutrality is nothing more than a vocalised desirable, 
but ultimately unattainable, ideal. For the P5 themselves, even the expressed desire to act 
impartially is questionable.  
 
 This thesis is based on a theoretical analysis and case study, which will examine the 
desirability and possibility of political neutrality and impartiality in the context of the UNSC. It will 
also closely examine the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) which advocates claim is an 
emerging norm that shifts the traditional notion of Westphalian exclusive sovereignty, to one of 
sovereignty as responsibility. This means that if a sovereign fails to meet its responsibility of 
protecting its citizens from mass atrocity crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity, then 
the international community, with authorisation from the UNSC, has a duty to take collective action 
to ensure the safety of that population.  
 It will not examine what Jane Boulden describes as the ‘impartial UNSC mandates’ which 
consists of those “whose purpose is to authorize the monitoring of peace agreements or agreed 
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cease-fires.  Such mandates are impartial, because all that they do is commit the UN to overseeing 
terms or arrangements already agreed by the parties.”9 In these situations, the UNSC has not 
engaged in the terms of the agreement or in any political decision-making about the conflict itself, 
and such situations are therefore beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 The first two chapters of this thesis will provide an overview of the history and theory of the 
problem of impartiality and neutrality at the UN. The third chapter will examine the case of Libya as 
a detailed example of the issues raised in the first two chapters. The fourth chapter will then provide 
an assessment of proposed ideas around Security Council reform, followed by a discussion on the 
limitations of those ideas. 
 Chapter One will begin by discussing the formation of the UN and its stated goal of 
functioning under political neutrality. In particular, it will look at how the organisation was created 
to operate as an impartial and neutral agency capable of transcending politics, while maintaining the 
capacity to mediate international conflict and advance liberal ideals such as human rights and 
democracy. This will include a discussion on early figures that influenced the development of the UN, 
such as Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, as well as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. 
The disappointment of the Cold War, followed by the rejuvenation the UN experienced at the Cold 
War’s end will be analysed. In this vein, particular focus will be given to the implications the end of 
the Cold War had on the evolution of humanitarian intervention, and in particular the emergence of 
the RtoP.  
 Chapter Two will examine arguments positing the impossibility of political neutrality in the 
UN. It will draw on existing critiques of UN impartiality and neutrality derived particularly from the 
work of Professor Anne Orford, and will discuss the disappointments of Hammarskjöld, including an 
examination of why the problems of neutrality are still persistent today. Following this will be a 
realist critique of the anti-politics of liberalism and idealism, drawing on the ideas of theorists such 
as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr.  These realist critiques will then be applied to the contemporary 
environment that the Council faces today, particularly with regard to the current crisis in Libya.  
 Chapter Three will explore in depth the 2011 Libyan intervention. It will begin by providing a 
brief overview of the conflict and how the RtoP concept was employed during the intervention. 
Following this will be an analysis of the UN Security Council response, namely the adoption of 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973, which amongst other provisions, referred the case of Libya to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and sanctioned a no-fly zone.   The dynamics and various political 
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interests of the ‘Western’ P5 members (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States), also 
known as the P3, and the ‘non-Western’ P5 states (China and Russia), the P2, will also be explored. 
In addition to this, the problem of selectivity and Council bias will be examined. This chapter will 
conclude with a summary of the ways in which politics lay at the heart of decision making in Libya, 
and the resulting repercussions for any expectation that the UNSC can act as an impartial arbiter of 
when legitimate humanitarian intervention can occur.   
 Chapter Four will examine the possibility of UN reform and whether proposals for change 
will have the capacity to transcend the current politics of the Council. It will begin by providing a 
brief outline of current reform proposals, which include an increase in the number of permanent and 
non-permanent members of the Council, as well as the elimination or limiting of the veto power 
currently wielded. The next section will specifically focus on two similar initiatives that have gained 
considerable attention: the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group’s (ACT) Code of 
Conduct, and the Restrain the Veto campaign. 
  This thesis will conclude by exploring the question of whether the proposed reforms can 







CHAPTER 1: THE FORMATION OF THE UN AND THE GOAL OF 
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY 
 The United Nations was conceived on the premise that the institution would function as an 
independent, impartial and neutral body for the promotion of international cooperation and 
collective security. Immediately following the end of World War II, and the defeat of the Axis 
powers, the domestic liberal ideals of impartiality and neutrality were believed by the founders of 
the UN to be transferrable to the international realm and be able to serve as the principles upon 
which the UN would be established.  However, efforts to operate as a politically neutral institution 
have been, and continue to be, hindered by several factors; the most obvious being its 
organisational structure, but also its failure to recognise the inherent dispositions of states. 
 This chapter will examine the formation of the UN and its proclaimed goal of political 
neutrality. Past experiences will be drawn upon to illustrate efforts of attaining such goals, as well as 
the implications these have had for the UNSC’s effectiveness, or lack thereof.  Particular focus will be 
placed on the ambitions of influential former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who is 
largely attributed with shaping the organisation as it is known today. Hammarskjöld’s vision for a 
politically neutral organisation, however, never fully manifested, and this was exemplified with his 
own discussions on the failings of the institution to respond to the emergence of the Cold War.  
 The end of the Cold War saw a short period of rejuvenation, however, which gave rise to the 
belief in some quarters that the Council could become more impartial and effective. During this 
period we see an increase in the number of humanitarian interventions carried out by member 
states, and subsequently the development of the RtoP doctrine. However, to many this veil of 
optimism was short lived, and the Council soon demonstrated, again, its inability to overcome 
inherent flaws in order to respond appropriately and in a timely manner to humanitarian crises. The 
current crises in both Syria and Libya are evidence of the Council’s inability to achieve the grand 
promises outlined in the RtoP, namely those enshrined and agreed upon by the UN in the Outcome 
Document of the 2005 UN World Summit.  
EARLY ASPIRATIONS FOR NEUTRALITY 
 A new era in international cooperation emerged at the end of World War II with the creation 
of the UN.  The institution’s aims were, firstly, to prohibit the unilateral use of force by states other 





Security Council.1  It was evident from the very beginning that the structure of the Security Council 
would prove problematic for the aspirations of an impartial and neutral organisation.  Nonetheless, 
the requirement of such a body was made clear by powerful founding member states during the 
negotiations leading up to its establishment.   
 The first mention of the UN was in discussion over a wartime military alliance, not a plan for 
a post-war organisation.2 War-time US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill drafted the 1941 Atlantic Charter that outlined the ‘United Nations’ goals of World 
War II which included: self determination of all peoples, respect for the current territorial borders, 
and abandonment of the use of force. The term ‘United Nations’ was further developed during the 
signing of the ‘Declaration by United Nations’ on January 1 1942, with signatories including Britain, 
the Soviet Union, China, and the US, along with 22 other countries. These states pledged to adhere 
to the principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter, and further promised to engage in a maximum war 
effort and vowed against making a separate peace plan.3 The inception of the ‘United Nations’ 
within the context of a wartime military alliance was founded upon a preconceived notion of what 
the parties believed would best serve their national interests at the time. This illustrates that as early 
as its embryonic stage, adherence to principles of impartiality and neutrality would be highly 
challenging.  
 Further events leading up to the institution’s establishment included the 1943 Moscow and 
Tehran conferences, which resulted in the signing of a declaration calling for the early establishment 
of an international organisation to maintain international peace and security. In 1944, state 
representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the US met at Dumbarton Oaks to negotiate 
a proposal for the structure of a world organisation, which was then presented to the United Nations 
governments. Four principal bodies were to make the body known as the United Nations, namely, 
the General Assembly (UNGA), composed of all UN members, an International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
a Secretariat, and a Security Council made up of eleven members, of which five would be permanent 
(known as the P5) and six to be chosen by the UNGA for a non-permanent and rotational term of 
two years.4 The blueprint of the new international organisation was reinforced at the February 1945 
Yalta Conference, where then Soviet President Joseph Stalin agreed to join the United Nations and 
                                                          
1
 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, and Jennifer Welsh, The United Nations Security Council and War : The 
Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 175. 
2
 David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13. 
3
 “1942: Declaration of The United Nations,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-
nations-charter/1942-declaration-united-nations/index.html [accessed May 14, 2016}. 
4
 “1944-1945: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta,” United Nations, , http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-





together with Roosevelt and Churchill committed to establishing “a general international 
organisation to maintain peace and security.”5 
 The 1945 San Francisco Conference facilitated the signing of the foundational UN Charter.  A 
political compromise between the P5 and the other 45 founding member states resulted in the 
creation of a Security Council with five permanent seats, accompanied with the veto privilege. As 
New Zealand’s former Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir Jim McLay, reflected in a 
2010 speech, that while criticisms of the veto from small states were illustrative of their sentiments, 
there was never any possibility of their realisation. Small states voted against the veto as they 
believed “it would hamstring the search for peace and security; but it had already been agreed, 
several months earlier, at Yalta, by the ‘Big Three’, so that position – while principled and spirited – 
was largely symbolic.”6 During the San Francisco conference it was evident that the United Nations 
would only come into existence if the P5 were granted their veto privilege. This precondition was 
made strikingly clear when US Senator Tom Connally responded to the critics by stating that, “You 
may go home from San Francisco if you wish and report that you have defeated the veto... Yes, you 
can say you defeated the veto, but you can also say, “We tore up the Charter!”7 Without the support 
of powerful states who possessed the greatest political and military might, the Council would lack 
the capacity and authority to carry out any decision made, thus smaller states were ultimately 
coerced into conceding to the P5 demands.  
 The victors of World War II now had an instrument with which they could pursue their 
interests, so long as they had the approval of all permanent Council members. This was made legally 
possible with the creation of the intentionally vague UN Charter.  By failing to provide a definition of 
what constitutes the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council found itself in a 
position to respond to a theoretically unlimited range of possible threats at a time, and in a manner 
of its choosing. In fact, the Council does not have to wait until an actual breach of the peace has 
occurred before it can invoke the use of its own coercive measures. The UN Charter places no 
restriction on the Council’s right to make such a determination, other than in an anodyne reference 
in Article 24(2), which states that the Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN.8 This provision also allows for an obligation-free Council, as members need not 
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act on security problems that do not fall within their own self-interest. Responsibilities of the 
Council, which dictated when action was required, were similarly left intentionally vague.9  
 
 Key individuals who shaped the UN in its development stages include Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosevelt, as well as French philosopher and political thinker Jacques Maritain and Swedish 
diplomat, Dag Hammarskjöld. Each of these liberal figures argued strongly in favour of an 
organisation that would be based upon universal concepts of human rights. They hoped that this 
foundation would allow the organisation to function impartially, as it would not serve a single state, 
or group of states, but instead would serve the interests of humanity.  While this stated ambition of 
serving humanity would require an organisation that was capable of transcending the politics of the 
nation-state, its founders believed that the UN had the capacity to achieve such an ambitious goal. 
 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) was instrumental in the establishment of the UN and in 
enunciating the principles that it still claims to represent today. The idea of international 
institutionalised involvement in human rights emerged in FDR’s 1941 State of the Union Address to 
Congress, later known as the Four Freedoms Speech.  During the speech FDR proclaimed that, “In 
the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four 
essential freedoms.”10 According to FDR these were the freedom of speech and expression, freedom 
of worship, freedom for want, and freedom from fear. FDR’s international outlook was a stark 
departure from the traditional American isolationist foreign policy of the time. Furthermore, the 
importance he placed on promotion of universal human rights was encapsulated in his speech when 
he proclaimed that, “Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere.”11 
 After FDR’s death, Eleanor Roosevelt, alongside Jacques Maritain, became influential in 
setting a principled agenda for the United Nations, particularly in matters concerning human rights. 
Eleanor Roosevelt represented the US at the United Nations from 1945 to 1952 and also served as 
the chair of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) from its establishment until 
1951.  In 1948, Roosevelt wrote in Foreign Affairs that the real importance of the Human Rights 
Commission lay, “in the fact that throughout the world there are many people who do not enjoy the 
basic rights which have come to be accepted in many other parts of the world as inherent rights of 
all individuals, without which no one can live in dignity and freedom.”12 As Chairperson, she 
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proposed that the first task of the Commission should be the writing of the Bill of Human Rights. She 
argued that “the lack of standards for human rights the world over was one of the greatest causes of 
friction among the nations, and that recognition of human rights might become one of the 
cornerstones on which peace could eventually be based.”13 Eleanor Roosevelt acknowledged that as 
the Commission was not a court, it was unable to actually solve its petitioner’s problems; all it could 
do was write and say that “once the Bill of Human Rights was written, they might find that their 
particular problems came under one of its provisions.”14 Despite a Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and various organs of the UN dedicated to human rights, the notion of universal human rights 
remains a contested issue today. The difficulties in implementing these ideas “touch directly on the 
contested idea of the universal applicability of norms worldwide.”15 This point will be expanded 
upon in Chapter Two. 
 French philosopher Jacques Maritain worked alongside Roosevelt during the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Maritain described the Declaration as a “foundation for 
convictions universally shared by men however great the differences of their circumstances and 
their manner of formulating human rights.”16 He claimed that the “authority and goodwill of the 
United Nations will be exercised with ever increasing power to apply these means for the 
advancement of human happiness,” and further that the Declaration served as a type of statement 
of intent to all people and all governments of the “civilized world.”17 Maritain understood that the 
UN’s success was dependent on the realisation that “faith in freedom and democracy is founded on 
the faith in the inherent dignity of men and women.”18 Interestingly, he commented that the 
declaration depended “not only on the authority by which rights are safeguarded and advanced, but 
also on the common understanding which makes the proclamation feasible and the faith 
practicable.”19 Again, the idea of a ‘common understanding’ is contentious and will be expanded on 
in Chapter Two.  
 Despite the early aspirations of figures such as Roosevelt and Maritain, by the end of the 
1940s, early Cold War politics were threatening the drafting of the Declaration. According to Allida 
Black, “American conservatives charged any human rights document crafted by the United Nations 
would bring socialism to America while delegates from the Soviet bloc argued that racial segregation 
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proved that the western democracies gave only lip service to civil and political rights.”20 For Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the Declaration contained three Articles which were of vital importance: Article 15 which 
provides that “everyone has the right to nationality;”21 Article 16 which allows for individual 
freedom of thought and conscience, including the right to hold and change ones religious beliefs; 
and Article 21 which provides that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”22 Roosevelt stated that what was most 
important for her was to gain the acceptance of all member states because “they ought to support 
the standards toward which the nations must henceforward aim.”23 But who is vested with the 
authority to decide why these are the standards towards which all nations must henceforward aim? 
And why are they apparently vested with that authority? Questions surrounding authority and 
responsibility inevitably have implications for neutrality, especially when there is an issue that 
concerns protection and enforcement. The idea that all states must support a declared set of 
standards is susceptible to criticisms of ethnocentrism and is difficult to reconcile with the principle 
of impartiality.  
 
 Another example of the challenging aspiration for UN neutrality came under the leadership 
of the second UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld was responsible for shaping 
the functions of the Secretariat and for creating what is now known as Peacekeeping Operations. He 
was described by US President John F. Kennedy, as “the greatest statesman of our century,”24 and is 
also the only person who has been awarded a posthumous Nobel Peace Prize. Hammarskjöld 
believed that the relationship between the Holy Roman Empire and the princes who governed their 
individual territories was analogous to the relationship of the United Nations and the governments 
of nation states.  As Anne Orford has explained, the former UN Secretary-General believed the UN’s 
role was to: 
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Stand above international political, form an objective picture of the competing aims and interests of 
Members, anticipate conflicts that might arise between Members and make suggestions to 
governments aimed at preventing such conflict before they gave rise to public controversy.
25
  
Hammarskjöld developed the role of the Secretary-General (S-G) and its office, transforming it from 
solely as the chief administrative officer of the Organisation to one that “championed the expansion 
of dynamic executive action to fill the power vacuums created by the liquidation of the colonial 
system.”26  Hammarskjöld’s closest account of reasons as to why the UN held the proper authority to 
rule the decolonised world was its desire to be independent, impartial and neutral.27 
The self determination of the newly created states was believed possible due to the UN’s “unique 
characteristics of universality and neutrality.”28 Hammarskjöld was determined to prevent undue 
influences and abuses of the situation.29  
 
 Early on in his post of Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld recognised that national loyalty of 
Secretariat staff would have difficult implications for the neutrality of the UN. He gave much 
attention to the role of the international civil servant and believed that Articles 97, 100, and 101 of 
the Charter were of “fundamental importance for the status of the Secretariat, as together they 
created for the Secretariat an administrative position of full political independence.”30  During his 
last address to his staff on 8 September 1961, ten days before he was killed in a plane crash in the 
Congo, Hammarskjöld stated: 
If the Secretariat is regarded as truly international, and its individual members as owing no allegiance 
to any national government, then the Secretariat may develop as an instrument for the preservation 
of peace and security of increasing significance and responsibilities.
31
 
For Hammarskjöld, the idea that the international civil service was capable of truly acting on an 
international basis meant that he believed that tasks at the UN should be able to be carried out 
“without subservience to a particular national or ideological attitude.”32 Due to this belief, one of his 
first priorities as Secretary-General was to prevent external powers from interfering with processes 
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regarding Secretariat staff recruitment and dismissal in order to accommodate for a more impartial 
UN.  
 Hammarskjöld was attempting to circumvent the interference of powerful states, such as in 
1953, when the US President Dwight Eisenhower issued the Executive Order 10422, over concerns 
that the UN was heavily infiltrated by communists. The Executive Order prescribed “procedures for 
making available for the Secretary-General of the United Nations certain information concerning 
United States citizens employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat of the 
United Nations.”33 The order had effectively authorised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to 
have access to the UN headquarters in New York to carry out staff investigations, which in turn 
raised questions regarding Secretariat staff loyalty. Furthermore, Hammarskjöld’s predecessor 
Trygve Lie had earlier dismissed secretariat staff as requested by the US government, on grounds of 
failing to answer questions posed by US authorities regarding their involvement in ‘subversive’ 
activities.34 For Hammarskjöld, these actions highlighted the need to recall and clarify Article 100 of 
the UN Charter which prohibits the Secretary-General and the staff from seeking or receiving 
“instructions from any government or from any authority external to the Organisation.”35 He 
believed that in order for the UN to operate impartially it must be made clear that the organisation 
would not be influenced by any national interest or ideologies.  The Secretariat staff must not 
consider themselves to be “under two masters in respect to their official functions”36 as doing so 
would undermine the “international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and 
his staff.”37  While governments may provide information concerning staff members, it was 
ultimately up to the Secretary-General to evaluate the information and decide upon UN 
employment.38 
 The role of the Secretary-General has even further implications for the desirability of a 
politically neutral UN. Hammarskjöld believed that the legal basis upon which his authority was 
grounded was located in the constitutional responsibility for the general purposes set out in the 
Charter. At a meeting with the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China Chou En-Lai concerning 
a US pilot hostage situation, Hammarskjöld commented on the role of the Secretary-General: 
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When he acts for the purposes indicated, it is not and can never be permitted to be, on behalf of any 
nation, group of nations or even majority of Member nations as registered by a vote in the General 
Assembly. He acts under his constitutional responsibility for the general purposes set out in the 
Charter, which must be considered of common and equal significance to Members and Non-Members 
alike...Thus, sitting here at this conference table I do so as Secretary-General, not as a representative 




The subsequent release of the hostages was argued to be an example of successful quiet diplomacy 
in action, and signified another step towards the idea of an executive authority capable of 
transcending the interests of states.40 
 While Hammarskjöld believed that the role of S-G could be impartial, he did understand that 
there was some conflict between the different Articles of the Charter that outline the role of the S-G. 
Aside from managing the Secretariat and practicing quiet diplomacy, the Secretary-General, 
according to Article 99 of the Charter, also has the power to bring “to the attention of the Security 
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of intentional peace and 
security.”41  This transforms the role of Secretary-General “from a purely administrative official to 
one with an explicit political responsibility.”42  Hammarskjöld believed strongly that in spite of this 
new responsibility, it was still possible for the Secretary-General to act impartially:  
 
The Secretary-General has the duty to maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands on conflicts 
between Member nations unless and until such an action might help to resolve the conflict. However, 
the discretion and impartiality thus imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of his 
immediate task may not degenerate into a policy of expediency. He must also be a servant to the 




From this, it is clear that the role is full of complexity, to the extent that the possibility of acting truly 
impartially is questionable.  On the one hand, it is purportedly a neutral role, with the task of 
managing the organisation in accordance with the principles of the Charter, and on the other, the 
role lends a hand to the “policy-making cycle and the development and conceptualisation of 
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ideas.”44  Due to the perceived impossibilities of the Secretary-General’s role being truly neutral,  
Russian First Secretary to the UN, Nikita Khrushchev, proposed abolishing the Secretary-General post 
and replacing it with the establishment of a three person group as “there are not – nor can there be 
– neutral men.”45   
 Despite criticism of the neutrality of the S-G role, Hammarskjöld believed that infringement 
of the commitment to neutrality could be avoided if “the S-G undertook his tasks on the basis of this 
exclusively international responsibility and not in the interests of any particular State or group of 
States.”46 He considered that the extent of the S-G’s full political independence was “limited to 
administrative problems outside the sphere of political conflict of interest or ideology.”47 
Hammarskjöld claimed that Article 98, which maintained that the “S-G would carry out functions 
entrusted to him by the Security Council and the General Assembly,”48 and Article 99, which 
authorised the S-G to “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of international peace of security,”49 were problematic in ensuring a 
neutral and impartial Organisation.  Charging the S-G with these political responsibilities pushed “the 
UN beyond the concept of a non-political civil service into an area where the official, in the exercise 
of his functions, may be forced to take stands of a politically controversial nature.”50 This has 
obvious problematic implications for a supposed impartial organisation.  
 
DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE COLD WAR 
 The onset of the Cold War quickly defeated hopes that the Soviet Union and the United 
States were united in support of a vision for an UN strong enough to enforce international peace. 
The ideological divide between the two superpowers would have serious implications for the 
organisation that was created with the belief that it could transcend politics. Between 1946 and 
1949, the Soviet Union, as the ideological outcast at the time, exercised its veto privilege 26 times.  
By 1950, only five years after the signing of the Charter, it was becoming “clear that the treaty’s 
central tenet, the existence of a functional Security Council, was foundering.”51 That year, the Soviet 
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Union boycotted the Security Council in protest of the occupation of the permanent seat held by the 
Chinese government in Taiwan instead of the Chinese communist government on the mainland.  
Their absence allowed for the passing of Resolution 83, which recommended that “Member States 
of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel 
the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”52 Two days later the 
Soviet Government issued document S/1517 stating that due to its absence “it was quite clear that 
the said resolution of the Security Council on the Korean question has no legal force.”53 However, 
because their absence was considered an abstention vote, and not an exercise of their power of 
veto, their protest was not able to undermine the UN’s enforcement of the resolution.  Having 
realised their strategic mistake, the Soviets resumed their seat on the Council in August of that year 
and blocked any further Council efforts aimed at addressing the situtuation in Korea.  
 As a reaction to the stalemate experienced during the previous five years, the US Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson proposed a resolution where that “if the Security Council, because lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members, is unable to discharge its primary responsibility of the 
maintenance of peace and security...the Assembly should make provision for emergency special 
session to be convoked in twenty-four hours.”54 Despite strong objection from the Soviet delegation, 
General Assembly resolution 377 A (V), ‘Uniting for Peace,’ was adopted by a vote of 52-5 on 3 
November 1950.  Since then, the UNGA has only convened 10 emergency special sessions under the 
resolution.  
 The eruption of the 1956 Suez Crisis resulted in the first emergency session being convened 
on 1 November 1956 which in turn led Hammarskjöld to spearhead the establishment of the very 
first UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). UNEF I was primarily 
established in order “to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of 
the armed forces of Israel, France and the UK from Egyptian territory.” 55The key principles of 
independence, impartiality, and host-state consent guided the establishment and operation of the 
force, which became significant in shaping the rationale of executive action for subsequent decades 
of UN action. Firstly, it was mandated that UNEF I was to have an international character, mirroring 
the principles reflected in the UN Charter, and that the officer in charge of force was to operate fully 
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independent of policies of any nation.56 Secondly, the Force was required to act impartially. The 
General Assembly established the force, acting under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, on the terms 
that there was no intent to influence the military balance, and consequently the political balance, as 
they did not want to affect conflict resolution efforts.57 Thirdly, host-state consent was derived from 
the principle of equality amongst Member States, as “decisions about the use of force by foreign 
troops within a territory went to the heart of political sovereignty.”58  
 The newly created peacekeeping doctrine was, therefore, based on consent, neutrality and 
non-use of force.  According to Mark Duffield early peacekeeping efforts worked so well because: 
conflicts tended to have organisational cohesion, with well-structured groups of combatants 
operating along well-defined combat lines. This enabled the UN and its agencies to operate within 




However, Duffield also recognises the limitations of UN action during this time, as “whilst the UN 
would provide aid to those in need during the Cold War, the UN seldom intervened in ongoing 
conflicts, and when it did it was usually in the context of policing and agreed ceasefire.”60 One of the 
significant effects of Peacekeeping Operations during this time was the difficulty the Council faced in 
responding to operations, particularly when permanent members were politically opposed and 
exercised their privileges in order to further their political views.61 Stephen Schlesinger notes that 
the UN did nothing to prevent the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary and “remained neutral in the 
face of the Russian occupations of Czechoslovakia in 1968.” Furthermore, the US managed to 
sideline the UN during the 1954 CIA-inspired coup in Guatemala as well as during its war in Vietnam, 
and “stymied UN resolutions critical to America’s 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, its 
1983 invasion of Grenada, and its 1989 incursion of Panama.”62   While it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to explore these cases in any depth, it is clear that the permanent members of the Council, 
and most commonly the United States and the Soviet Union, subdued UN action coercion and by 
exercising their veto privilege. 
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 During the 1960s, notions of sovereignty and non-intervention were reasserted and the UN’s 
neutral role as a mediator and assistance provider, rather than an ideologically independent actor, 
was reinforced.63 Hammarskjöld promoted a model of preventative diplomacy, which was aimed 
toward prevention of superpower intervention in political vacuums. His vision was to circumvent 
superpower intervention, such as what he had witnessed first-hand in the Congo, in the hopes of 
mitigating the tensions of the Cold War.64 It was perhaps due to this reinforcement of the 
importance of state sovereignty that the legitimate use of force during this period was relatively 
limited.  
 Jennifer Welsh has identified only three main events which she views as most closely 
resembling humanitarian intervention during the Cold War period; India in East Pakistan (1971); 
Vietnam in Cambodia (1978); and Tanzania in Uganda (1979). She notes that “only the former two 
were discussed within the Council, and in both cases humanitarian rationales for military action 
were hotly contested.”65 According to Nicholas Wheeler, the “behaviour and rhetoric of member 
states during these cases indicate that humanitarian claims were not accepted as a legitimate basis 
for the use of force in this period.”66  
 With the untimely death of Hammarskjöld in 1961, a new S-G was elected, with the Burmese 
diplomat U Thant taking the post as the first non-European Secretary-General of the UN. Thant’s 
approach to the role differed from Hammarskjöld’s.  He strongly supported, for example, the idea 
that Pakistan’s internal repression “constituted a threat to international peace and security that the 
Council had a responsibility to address.”67 The claim that an internal crisis is an international threat 
deviates away from Hammarskjöld’s idea of a politically neutral UN.  This change in attitude and 
approach between the Secretary-Generals echoes the sentiment shared earlier by the Russian First 
Secretary Khrushchev regarding the establishment of the troika to replace the Secretary-General; it 
demonstrates that an individual is inevitably going to bring their own perspective and own set of 
prejudices to shaping their role, which makes it supremely difficult for the role of the S-G, or indeed 
the UN itself, to be truly politically neutral. 
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REJUVENATION AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
 The end of the Cold War gave hope to those who believed that the UN was capable of 
fulfilling its “promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”68 The quagmire in 
the Council appeared to be resolved as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. Due to the Soviets fall 
and the end of the Cold War, there was a marked increase in the number of UNSC resolutions. Russia 
had been quietened, and as a result of the new unipolar world order, the Council (primarily the 
Western ‘P3’ of the US, UK and France) became emboldened to commission military interventions, 
under the guise of humanitarian operations, in the name of a rejuvenated UN. Over time, the 
Council’s actions appeared to become more ambitious and frequent. International discourse on the 
concept of human security emerged, with the convergence of development and security. 
Symptomatic of this perceived era of rejuvenation of the liberal principles of the UN, David Chandler 
argued that this period saw a “shift away from security perceived as the protection of Self (national) 
interests to the needs (economic, health, environment, security etc) of the Other.”69 This new 
paradigm attempted to erase the relations of power and interest and replace them with “’freedom’ 
and ‘empowerment’ of the Other.70   Furthermore, according to Norrie MacQueen, the post-Cold 
War period witnessed the birth of a new type of peacekeeping which was increasingly post-
Westphalian.  According to MacQueen, “objectives of interventions are increasingly humanitarian 
and ‘political’ in the sense that they are focused primarily on improving conditions inside countries 
rather than on managing the (Westphalian) system of states which they form.71 
 
 The new political climate and accompanying dominant discourse of the post-Cold War era 
meant that the principle of impartiality became increasingly problematic. The Charter’s inherent 
contradiction between the commitment to non-intervention and the promotion of human rights led 
to a stretching of the definitions of what could constitute threats to international peace and security, 
in order for the Council to be able to legally sanction military intervention. Welsh notes that Security 
Council Resolution 688, which condemned the “repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many 
parts of Iraq” and demanded that “as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace 
and security, immediately end this repression,”72 is often cited as an example of a significant shift in 
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what the Council regarded as constituting such a threat.73 France, as a P5 member, claimed that 
“failure to protect the Kurds would damage the political and moral authority of the Council,” and 
Turkey, as a non-permanent member of the Council, argued that “the movement of so many civilians 
was affecting regional security.”74 Here, threats to the maintenance of international peace and 
security extended to include the flow of refugees across international borders, rather than the actual 
repression of the Kurds,75 a significant shift from the traditional approaches to understanding intra-
state conflicts. 
 The crises in Somalia and Haiti resulted in further unprecedented UN action which was to 
have serious implications for the principle of impartiality. Between January 1992 and November 
1994 the Council passed a staggering 17 resolutions regarding the crisis in Somalia.  The US-led 
intervention in Somalia became the first intervention in which “the Council authorised military 
action under Chapter VII without the consent of the sovereign government and for solely 
humanitarian reasons.”76 Security Council Resolution 794 authorised a US-led enforcement mission, 
which was mandated to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”77 In 1994, another American 
spearheaded intervention was authorised, this time in Haiti, under Security Council Resolution 940. 
The Security Council mandated intervention in Haiti was again justified under Chapter VII. A US-led 
multinational force was authorised to restore the legitimately elected President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, as well as the other members of the Haitian government.78 Resolution 940 was a watershed 
moment in authorising the use of force to achieve regime change.  
   
Despite an increase in purported humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, it was the 
inaction of the UN in the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo which caused significant outrage amongst the 
international community. The UNSC found itself facing harsh criticism, even from within the 
institution itself. The inability of the P5 members to reach consensus, even in the face of gross and 
systematic human rights abuses, reaching the levels of genocide, starkly exposed the Council’s 
inability to act impartially, and as a neutral organisation. The primacy of self-interest reared its face 
time and time again, and the ad hoc and selective approach to conducting humanitarian intervention 
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was exposed as primarily a calculation of national interest. The eventual disclosure of the depth of 
human suffering in Rwanda (in particular) evoked impassioned pleas that ‘something must be done,’ 
and in a similar vein the phrase ‘never again’ widely circulated in world capitals and New York. By 
the late 1990s, UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, had begun a concerted effort to 
stimulate the debate on the role of state sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and international 
responsibility. In his 2000 Millennium Report, Annan stated that “if humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”79   
In a widely cited article in the Economist, Annan outlined his strong belief that state 
sovereignty was increasingly being redefined, “When we read the Charter today, we are more than 
ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse 
them.”80 Following a direct request from Annan himself, in 2000 the Canadian government 
established an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
The Commission’s general mandate was to build “a broader understanding of the problem of 
reconciling intervention for human protection and sovereignty.”81 By 2001, the Commission had 
released the report entitled “The Responsibility to Protect.”  The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
concept is an extension of an idea that originates from the social contract theories of the 
Enlightenment. Those theories were based on the premise that individuals must submit some of 
their freedoms to a sovereign authority in order to gain protection and greater freedom.  The ICISS 
Report recommended a new way of conceptualising sovereignty: from sovereignty as a right, to 
sovereignty as a responsibility. It purports that the state has a responsibility to protect its citizens, 
the international community has a duty to assist states requiring aid, and if a state fails to protect its 
citizens, it is the duty of international community to intervene.82 The Commission clearly outlined 
their belief in this reconceptualisation of sovereignty and responsibility in the following: 
 
The implication is plain. If by its actions and, indeed, crimes, a state destroys the lives and rights of its 
citizens, it forfeits temporarily its moral claim to be treated as legitimate. Its sovereignty, as well as its 
right to non-intervention, is suspended…In brief, the three traditional characteristics of a state in the 
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Westphalian system (territory, authority, and population) have been supplemented by a fourth, 




 It is noteworthy that the ICISS report expressed some reservation about entrusting the 
USNC to act as the “proper authority” for military action related to RtoP, given its frequent 
susceptibility to politicisation.84 In an effort to overcome these reservations, the Commission 
outlined a range of different reform efforts targeted at the Council, which it believed were necessary 
to enable the UNSC to act legitimately on behalf of the international community. While the report 
argued that it was not attempting to find an alternative to the UNSC to act as a source of 
international authority, it did argue that the Council had to improve from its previous efforts.85 The 
report also asserted that the use of veto privilege by a P5 member, or indeed simply the threat of its 
use, was mostly likely the principal obstacle to effective international action to protect populations 
during significant humanitarian crises.86  
The Commission’s recommendation to overcome this issue was that the UNSC should agree 
not use their veto to obstruct resolutions that authorised military intervention to protect 
populations where, “their vital state interests are not involved.”87 The Commission argued that, “it is 
unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian 
concern.”88 However, in the end, the Commission does not deviate from the current international 
status quo, and they recommended that the UNSC should be the source of authority for the RtoP 
doctrine. The report states, “there is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations 
Security Council to authorise military intervention for human protection purposes,”89  and 
furthermore that the UN was “unquestionably the principal institution for building, consolidating 
and using the authority of the international community.”90  
By 2005, the concept of RtoP was being hotly contested on the world stage, at the World 
Summit convened at the United Nations. Intense political wrangling and diplomatic negotiations 
resulted in a diluted form of ICISS’ RtoP being adopted in the Summit’s Outcome Document. Under 
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paragraph 138 and 139 of the document, all UN member states agreed that the international 
community is, “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council…on a case-by-case basis… [should] national authorities manifestly fail to protect 
their populations.”91 In a move that was hardly surprising given the Council’s fierce guarding of their 
own power ascendancy, the Summit Outcome Document overtly avoids mention of any of the 
reform measures, the use of the veto, or the precautionary principles recommended in the ICISS 
report. Despite its diluted form, S-G Annan has since proclaimed that the inclusion of RtoP in the 
document was one of his “most precious achievements.”92 
 The Libya intervention in 2011 was initially perceived by many as an example of the 
successful application of RtoP. Security Council Resolution 1973, which sanctioned NATO airstrikes 
against the Qaddafi regime, had been described as an example of “the humanitarian imperative and 
the normative power of global civil society and specifically RtoP.”93 Soon after the passing of the 
Resolution, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon issued a press release stating that, 
 
The Security Council today has taken an historic decision. Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and 
unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect 




Academics such as Alex Bellamy claimed that Resolution 1973 had set a precedent for the Security 
Council in the sense that “it will not be inhibited as a matter of principle from authorising 
enforcement for protection purposes without host state consent.”95 Likewise, Thomas Weiss claimed 
success in Libya would “put teeth in the fledgling RtoP doctrine.”96 However, such optimism was 
soon stifled by the lack of sustained peace in Libya, as well as the eruption of the Syrian civil war and 
the subsequent lack of Council action. Details of the Council’s failures within this context will be 
further examined in Chapter Three. 
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CONTINUING FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE UNSC  
 Despite the Council’s stated objectives, it has been roundly criticised by a vast array of world 
leaders. Criticism has commonly included accusations of paralysis, lack of impartiality, selectivity, 
hypocrisy, as well as strong condemnation of the Council for being undemocratic and 
unrepresentative.  At the 2013 UNGA debate, Former Turkish President Abdullah Gül stated that: 
 
We must realise that inaction by the Security Council only emboldens aggressive regimes. We need a 
UN capable of forcing the perpetrators of brutal actions to submit to justice and the rule of law. 
Decisive action is the only way that the UN system will remain relevant and credible. To face this new 





 The conflict in Syria has featured heavily during recent UNGA summits and debates and is often 
cited as a contemporary example of the Council operating ineffectively, and with bias. Former Polish 
President Bronislaw Komorowski strongly criticised the P5 during his 2012 Debate, arguing that the 
P5 had prioritised their own national interests, resulting in an ineffective Council, he similarly 
commented on the inaction and self-interest surrounding the conflict during the 2013 Debate stating 
that: 
 
Regrettably, in the Syrian dispute the members of the Security Council have spoken out for individual 
sides in the war and supported them in various ways rather than make them stop fighting and commit 





 Lack of fair representation is one of the most prevalent criticisms made against the Council, 
particularly given that it continues to reflect the balance of power as it existed at its inception in 
1945. While numbers of UN membership have increased by almost 60% since 1945, this increase has 
not resulted in change to membership of the Council. Consequently, only 8% of the member states 
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are now represented in the Council, compared with 20% in 1945.99  Europe, which accounts for 
barely 5% of the world’s population, still controls 33% of Council seats. Developing nations, who 
account for more than half the world’s population, are largely underrepresented.100 Richard M. Price 
and  Mark W. Zacher note that, “throughout the 1990s, 65 of the estimated 79 episodes of conflict 
occurred within developing countries, and over half of the bottom 47 countries on the Human 
Development Index are still suffering from the aftermath of violent conflict.”101 Conflict in the 
developing world occupies the Council’s agenda more often than issues pertaining to the developed 
world; yet, developing nations are able to make only a small impact on decision-making processes 
which directly concern them, which is owed to the fact that they lack permanent representation.102   
 Aside from being unrepresentative, the Council, contrary to the Organisation’s endorsement 
of democracy, operates undemocratically.  Article 2(1) of the Charter states that “the Organization is 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”103 However, the agreed trade-
off between idealism and realism, which allowed for the creation of the permanent seats that 
possess the veto privilege, undermined aspirations of a truly democratic organisation.  The equality 
of Member States is expressed in the composition and voting procedures of the UNGA where every 
member is represented and has one vote, irrespective of size or population. For these reasons, the 
UNGA has frequently been referred to as the ‘democratic’ organ of the UN.104 Comparing the 
operation of the UNGA to the Council generates a major contradiction: democracy is preached as 
the universally superior political system of the global age, but the pre-eminent global security 
institution is not ruled according to democratic values.105 The unbalanced relationship between the 
UNGA and the Council has “affected the principles of representativeness and respect for sovereign 
equality as well as having weakened the legitimacy of decisions adopted by the Council.”106 
 It is evident that as long as the P5 maintain their current veto power, any response by the 
Council, and indeed the UN, to intrastate violence and crises will remain intrinsically both selective 
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and inconsistent.  The selectiveness and inconsistency of the Council was highlighted during a 
speech Singapore’s Permanent Representative to the UN in 2001: 
 
While the New York City Fire Department is obligated to respond to every fire, the Council picks and 
chooses which emergencies to respond to on the basis of geopolitics and the national interests of its 
most important members. The question of whether the Council speaks for, and on behalf of, the 
international community becomes particularly pertinent when the ‘representatives’ chose ‘targets for 





This selectiveness and inconsistency undermines any aspirations for a politically neutral 
organisation.  From the outset of the intervention in Libya, for example, it was met with criticisms of 
being conducted in the face of other potentially more devastating crises, and “the hypocrisy 
ostensibly evidenced by the West’s silence over oppression elsewhere in the Middle East.”108  
 
 The recent Council paralysis regarding the crises situations in Ukraine and Syria are examples 
of Council disappointment. Sydney D. Bailey suggested that the wielding of the veto might “cause a 
paralysis in the Council at the very moment when positive action is most needed.”109 The current 
Syrian conflict is a case in point. As of February 2016, the Syrian Center for Policy Research has 
documented the killing of more than 470,000 people since March 2011.110 The Council has passed 
eight resolutions regarding humanitarian access, observer missions and most recently, a ceasefire 
and political settlement. Russia and China have vetoed four draft resolutions on the grounds of 
adherence to the principle of nonintervention and respect of sovereign territory.  Prior to the 
escalation of the crisis in Syria, the Libyan intervention was argued to have given clout to the RtoP 
doctrine, yet the subsequent inaction in Syria and the continuing humanitarian crisis in Libya only 
reinforces claims of a selective and inconsistent Council, one that is incapable of demonstrating 
political neutrality. 
 Another problematic crisis resulting in frustrations with the Security Council is the conflict in 
the Ukraine, which directly involves on-the-ground action by a P5 member. New Zealand Foreign 
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Affairs Minister Murray McCully argued at the 69th General Assembly in 2014 that: “The Council has 
been essentially a bystander as one of the Permanent Members has undermined the integrity of 
another member State.”111 In March 2014, the Ukrainian port of Crimea was annexed by Russian and 
Russian-backed forces, following a widely criticised ‘referendum’ on whether the region wished to 
re-join Russia. Crimea was strategically very important to Russia, given Moscow’s quest to ensure 
continued access to their naval base in Sevastopol, which is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Despite 
early international condemnation and economic sanctions by some Western nations against 
Moscow, Russia has shown no signs of yielding control of the region, and the issue has all but fallen 
off the register of the current crises discourse. It is unsurprising that the only adopted Resolution 
concerning the Ukraine was Security Council Resolution 2202, which was merely an endorsement of 
the Minsk Agreements that contained a set of measures to alleviate the war in Donbass and, also 
unsurprisingly, made no reference to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian-backed 
forces. 
 In July 2015, Malaysia, Australia, the Netherlands and Ukraine presented a Council 
Resolution attempting to give greater powers to the UN to prosecute those suspected of downing 
the passenger plane Malaysian Airlines MH17, which was bought down over eastern Ukraine in 
2014. It is widely believed that the flight was brought down by Russian-backed separatists in 
Ukraine. Russia has vehemently denied any involvement in the disaster. The Resolution was quickly 
vetoed by Russia, with the Russian Permanent Represent to the UN, Vitaly Churkin defending the use 
of the veto, and arguing that there had been an "aggressive backdrop of propaganda in the 
media"112 on the whole issue of MH17. In response to the vetoing of the Resolution, Minister 
McCully told the Council he was deeply disappointed in Russia’s actions, and that it was occasions 
such as these which demonstrated why New Zealand had taken a strong position on Council reform, 
and particularly reform of the veto power.113  
 The recent crises in Ukraine and Syria and the lack or limited Council action have, in part, 
caused the period of rejuvenation experienced during the post-Cold War era to return to one of 
disappointment, similar to the Council’s experience during the Cold War. The conflicts have 
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highlighted the partiality and self interest of the P5, and the inadequacy of the RtoP in addressing 
those issues. The Ukraine crisis, in particular, proved that it is impossible for the Council to act 
impartially, especially when a member of the P5 is one of the major parties to the conflict.  
 
 It has been clear since the early stages of the UN that adherence to the principles of 
neutrality and impartiality was inevitably going to be highly challenging. The very structure of the 
Council is in itself in the favour of the victors of Word World II. The five permanent seats and 
accompanying veto privilege are, unsurprisingly, the strong points of criticism, as well as the 
common themes of Council reform efforts.  The human rights agenda advocated by the likes of 
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt are based on concepts that are arguably ethnocentric and lack any 
sense of cultural relativism. The stalemate during the Cold War highlighted the implications that 
superpower rivalry would have on Security Council neutrality. A period of perceived rejuvenation 
following the end of the Cold War saw an increase in military interventions sanctioned by the 
Council, but also the occurrence of arguably preventable genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. The 
Council was heavily criticised for failing to prevent the occurrence of these atrocities, and 
increasingly the call from liberal pundits was for more politically neutral actions from the P5. While 
RtoP was initially lauded as a liberal remedy to the problems facing the Council, the cases of Libya 
and Syria have illustrated that the promulgation of the RtoP doctrine was not the solution to 
achieving politically neutrality, and thus an effective and credible Council.  But why is this the case? 





CHAPTER 2: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL NEUTRALITY 
 The agreement on the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document saw a UN 
commitment to the implementation of the responsibility to protect concept as part of its 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.  According to Anne Orford, this 
commitment may be perceived “as an attempt to integrate pre-existing but dispersed practices of 
protection into a coherent account of international authority.”1 This chapter examines the possible 
fallacies of reconciling the responsibility to protect concept with the impartiality principle.  It will 
begin with a brief discussion on the original concepts of protection from a liberal perspective, 
followed by a critique of the scientism of liberalism. This will comprise of a critical analysis of liberal 
ideals such as rationalism, universal morality and the rule of law drawn from the ideas of influential 
theorists E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau.  A subsequent discussion of the previous 
disappointments of Hammarskjöld will be provided by recalling Orford’s analysis of why the 
Secretary-General’s aspirations of impartiality could not be met. The chapter will then conclude with 
a discussion on the relevance of these criticisms today. 
REALIST CRITIQUES OF THE ANTI-POLITICS OF LIBERALISM/IDEALISM 
 In order to understand Orford’s conclusions regarding the impossibility of the Council’s 
capacity to act impartially, it is important to take a closer look at the original liberal relationship 
between responsibility and protection, as well as the evolution of scientific thought. The liberal 
narrative “began during the Renaissance as a reaction to religious orthodoxy, gained strength 
throughout the Reformation, and became one of the main political forces in the Enlightenment.”2 
The end of feudalism in the 15th century and the development of the scientific method by the likes 
of Galileo, Bacon and Descartes in the late 16th and early 17th centuries led to the challenge of 
tradition and faith, and to the interest in reason and individualism.  
 This period saw the emergence of influential political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke.  Although Hobbes is typically associated with the realist school of thought, his thought 
on the existence of universal natural rights is prevalent within the liberal perspective. Scholars such 
as Leo Strauss and Ferdinand Tönnies have gone so far in arguing that “Hobbes was the true founder 
of liberalism”3 and that he “had not been a teacher of despotism but of natural rights.”4 A 
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commonality that Hobbes and Locke shared was the need for a state to ensure the protection of 
natural rights, and the necessity for people to submit some of their freedoms to the sovereign in 
order to make this possible. Both theorists believed that it was necessary to cede some individual 
freedom to the state in order to maximise individual freedom. This idea would be further developed 
by Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762), where he suggested that “what man loses by the social 
contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can 
take: what he gains by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he 
possesses.”5 
 Where Hobbes and Locke diverged, in this regard, was on the extent to which a state should 
exercise its authority over its citizens. While Hobbes advocated for an absolute power, a Leviathan 
so powerful and fearful that it was unable to be contested, Locke proposed a constitutional 
sovereign that would be limited by the rule of law and the separation of powers. Furthermore, Locke 
believed that should the state fail to protect the natural rights of its citizens, citizens had the right to 
revolution. From this it can be surmised that in Hobbes’s view, sovereignty was maintained by the 
sovereign, while in Locke’s view, sovereignty was to be maintained by the people.   
 It is clear that Locke’s idea of constitutional sovereignty was the most influential in the 
development of Western democracies. This is evident in the discourse surrounding the American 
and French revolutions.  Less than a century after Locke’s Two Treatises of Government was 
published, Thomas Jefferson drafted the 1776 United States Declaration of Independence which 
draws striking parallels to Locke’s ideology, particular where it declares, “that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”6 In France, although it was never officially adopted, The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1793 similarly states that, “Government is instituted 
in order to guarantee to man the enjoyment of his natural and imprescriptible rights...these rights 
are equality, liberty, security, and property...all men are equal by nature and before law.”7 
 At the time that the concepts of natural rights and sovereignty were developing, so were the 
developments of scientific thought and reason. By the 18th and 19th centuries, the acceptance of 
science and reason were well established. It was becoming commonly believed that the problems of 
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the social world could be solved by the application of scientific principles, and this is reflected in the 
emphasis on human rationality within liberal thought. This idea rests upon two premises: that 
human beings act rationally once educated; and that social problems can be treated similarly to 
mathematical problems. Given this, it was believed it was only a “matter of time before man will 
have acquired all the knowledge necessary to solve the problems of the physical and social world.”8 
 Liberal international thought suggests that “nations are associates and not rivals in the grand 
social enterprise.”9 Contrary to proponents of realism who believe that the enduring struggle for 
power and survival are at the core of international relations, liberal thought tends to espouse that 
power politics can be tamed through rational programmes and institutions, where the rational 
values of truth and justice prevail.  Woodrow Wilson argued in 1917 that that the world was at the 
beginning of a new age where “it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of 
responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are 
observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.”10 Due to the apparent belief in the 
possible transfer of ‘the same standards of conduct’ to the international realm it was believed that 
relations between states should and could be modelled on relations between civilised individuals 
within a civilised state.  
 As identified by Mark W. Zacher and Richard Matthew, today, the many strands of liberal 
theory all hold in common the “beliefs in progress conceived in terms of greater human freedom, 
the importance of cooperation to progress, and a process of scientific and intellectual modernization 
as the driving force behind cooperation and human progress.”11 It contributes significantly to the 
behaviours and organisation of the contemporary international arena, and is arguably the most 
extensive form of political theory that underpins international relations. While some commentators, 
such as John J. Mearsheimer, may argue that realism remains dominant in international relations12, 
prevalent discourses of freedom, democracy and human rights are all derived from the liberal 
perspective. International institutions, such as the UN, and its predecessor, the League of Nations, 
were established to promote such principles in the endeavour to maintain international peace and 
security. 
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 It was following the League’s failure and the horrors of WWII that political thinkers such as 
E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau criticised the liberal notions of rationalism, moral universalism, 
and the power of the legal formula.  As previously mentioned, the UN was in part founded upon the 
liberal principle of impartiality which would allow for the organisation to transcend the politics of 
nation-states.  This arguably erroneous premise will be explored in the next section, with an analysis 
of a realist critique of the anti-politics of liberalism. Here, the ideas of Carr and Morgenthau will be 
explored, with particular reference to Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939) and Morgenthau’s 
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946).  
 While E.H. Carr may be considered one of the founders of modern realism, The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis critiques the idealism of the interwar years of 1919 – 1939, rather than providing a 
theory of realism.13  Ironically, Carr was appointed the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International 
Politics at the University of Aberystwyth in 1936, after serving time in the British Foreign Office. It 
was during this period that he wrote The Twenty Years’ Crisis which heavily criticises the UN’s 
predecessor, the League of Nations.  Although written before the establishment of the UN, his ideas 
are still relevant and applicable to the contemporary world.   
 Likewise, Scientific Man still holds relevance today, despite being written only a year after 
the UN’s establishment. In Scientific Man, Morgenthau makes an “attack not simply on mainstream 
international law but also on liberalism and Western modernity.”14 Although it helped to pave the 
way for the Realist school of international relations, Morgenthau refrained from describing himself 
as a Realist. Instead, according to William E. Scheuerman, Morgenthau “endorsed a vision of political 
ethics which underscored a series of severe moral tests which responsible political actors were 
expected to pass.”15   
 Morgenthau and Carr provide critiques of liberal theory that illuminate why commonly held 
expectations of international organisations are seldom met and thus deemed ineffective. Their 
critiques are particularly useful when measured against the functioning of the UNSC. Themes of 
science and rationality versus human nature and its lust for power are examined, as well as the 
concept of universal morality and the rule of law versus political solutions.  This section will conclude 
with an investigation on the impact that liberal tools have had on the influence of international 
                                                          
13
 John J. Mearsheimer, “E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On,” International Relations 19, no. 2 (June 1, 
2005): 141, doi:10.1177/0047117805052810. 
14
 William E. Scheuerman, “Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics,” 








relations and why expectations of the United Nations Security Council are in need of 
reconsideration.  
Rationalism vs. Human Nature 
 As has been outlined earlier in this chapter, the belief that science can transcend politics is 
premised on the assumption that problems in nature and society can both be remedied with the 
application of science, that is, a philosophy of rationalism.  Carr and Morgenthau discuss at length 
the concept of rationalism, defined as the belief “that regards reason as the chief source and test of 
knowledge,” and that “reality itself has an inherently logical structure.”16  According to Morgenthau, 
liberalism assumes that “politics plays the role of a disease to be cured by means of reason.”17 By 
this definition, liberalism can only accept international aims which can be justified in the light of 
reason.  The liberal belief that rationalism can overcome war is premised on the idea that the laws of 
nature provide for harmony and cooperation between people. According to Scott Burchill, liberals 
believe war is “both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some 
peculiarity of human nature,”18 therefore all conflicts among states are believed to be capable of 
rational solution. The liberal belief in rationalism goes to the extent that in the event of conflict, men 
must eventually meet on the common ground of reason. When they do, they will realise that their 
apparent conflict can be “dissolved into a rational formula acceptable to all.”19 
 However, for both Morgenthau and Carr, rationalism is often misplaced when attempting to 
analyse the social world.  The essence of Morgenthau’s argument is that liberalism attempts to apply 
scientific principles to the social world whilst failing to consider human nature’s lust for power. He 
claims that, “our civilization assumes that the social world is susceptible to rational control 
conceived after the model of the natural science, while the experiences, domestic and international, 
of the age contradict this assumption.”20 He argues that the application of rationalism to the social 
world has misunderstood the nature of man, the nature of the social world, and the nature of reason 
itself.21   
 Regarding the nature of man, Morgenthau claims that human beings have not one, but three 
dimensions. Rationalism ignores mans biological and spiritual dimensions which “misconstrues the 
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function reason fulfils within the whole of human existence.”22  The failure to consider human 
beings’ biological and spiritual dimensions, suggests that all social problems can be solved by purely 
rational means, which distorts any ethical considerations. The nature of the natural world and the 
social world are not reconcilable and suggesting that they are “has misconstrued the nature of 
politics and political action altogether.”23  
 In terms of the nature of reason itself, Morgenthau draws four conclusions about 
rationalism: that the rationally right and the ethically right are identical; that rationally right action is 
of necessity the successful one; education leads man to the rationally right, hence good and 
successful action; and that the laws of reason, as applied to the social sphere, are universal in their 
application.24 To assume that the rationally right and ethically right are identical suggests that all 
ethical problems can be solved by adopting the scientific method. The morally right decision is 
therefore “determined by the universal laws of science, and thus only ignorance or irrationality 
prevented individuals from acting ethically.”25 Assuming the rationally right action is necessarily the 
successful one stems from the acceptance that as “conformity with the laws of nature guarantees 
success in the physical world, so in the social world does compliance with the laws of reason.”26 The 
conclusion that liberals believe education leads man to the rationally right suggests that all that is 
required to prevent conflict is education and social reform. This would, according to liberal pundits, 
generate universal moral enlightenment, which would in turn eradicate conflict and politics.  
 Carr claimed the liberal idea that education leads man to behave rationally was problematic 
because it placed too much trust in the power of public opinion. He argued that an essential 
foundation of the liberal creed was “the belief that public opinion can be relied on to judge rightly 
on any question rationally presented to it, combined with the assumption that it will act in 
accordance with this right judgement.”27  However, the idea that public opinion could prevent war 
was challenged with the eruption of the Manchuria crisis. Carr claimed that this event demonstrated 
that “the condemnation of international public opinion was a broken reed.”28  Carr’s work helps to 
demonstrate that no matter how strongly public opinion condemns a situation, states will act 
regardless in the pursuit of their self interests, if the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived 
costs.  
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 According to Carr, liberals previously assumed that wars were waged to satisfy the self 
interests of princes, and that under a republican form of government, there would be no war as 
reason would expose the absurdity of international anarchy. Furthermore, once more people 
received the necessary education “enough people would be rationally convinced” and put an end to 
international anarchy.29  Democratic peace theory shares a similar underlying assumption in that 
democracies do not go to war with each other because “liberal states, founded on such individual 
rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected 
representation are fundamentally against war.”30  Given this, proponents of democratic peace 
theory argue that the more democracies there are, the more peace there will be. In other words, 
once states received the ‘necessary education’ they would be convinced to operate democratically. 
However, as Rene Girard argues, the problem with the democratic peace theory is that, while it 
provides conditions in which peace occurs, it ignores the origins of violence.31  For Girard, violence 
originates in desire.32  As subjects desire similar things, other subjects are seen as “roadblocks to 
that desire.” The can create violent conditions, and when it does, it does not necessarily occur 
between the competing subjects. As Girard argues, violence can be: 
 
redirected to a surrogate victim who ends up being a scapegoat...non-democracies are merely 
scapegoats for democracies so that order can be maintained in communities for democracies. 
Therefore, if the world becomes composed entirely of democracies, there will be no scapegoats left 




This argument echoes Morgenthau’s assumptions that what liberals fail to consider, from the realist 
perspective, is the reality of human nature. Basic impulses and the “irrational lust for power” are not 
given due consideration when contemplating the political realm. Hence, “Politics is a struggle for 
power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal, and the modes 
of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determines the technique of political action.”34 
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Morgenthau believed, in short, that political science should pay particular attention to man’s 
irrational tendencies.  
Moral Universalism  
 Like the idea of rationalism, moral universalism is another feature of liberalism. The 
possibility of a perpetual peace (and democratic peace theory) is dependent on the concept of moral 
universalism, which assumes that every nation has an identical interest in peace. Furthermore, any 
nation which desires to disturb the peace is irrational and immoral.35 Therefore, from a liberal 
perspective, their goal is to “develop and promote moral standards which would command universal 
consent, knowing that in doing so states may be required to jeopardize the pursuit of their own 
national interests.”36 Carr claims that supposed absolute and universal principles such as national 
self-determination, free trade or collective security are “not principles at all, but the unconscious 
reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular 
time.”37  Policies are judged good or bad according to the extent to which they conform to, or 
diverge from, such principles. Orford argues that the “the claim to be intervening on behalf of the 
universal values of a common humanity was so deeply embedded within a Christian metaphysics of 
action, that it was difficult for those who believed that the Third World needed saving to experience 
humanitarian action as political.”38  In order to maintain this vision, the unavoidable political 
predicaments of sovereignty and representation had to be projected onto the state and away from 
the international community so that the international community and international law could be 
perceived as apolitical and unified.39  
 The belief in the universal applicability of the laws of reason to the social world is an 
extension of the universal applicability of the laws of nature.  Keith Dowding argues that the 
universality of rationality and reason extends to “the sense that what constitutes reason must be 
interpretable and interpretation requires some common understanding or universal principles to 
enable comprehension.”40 However, he continues by stating that “what constitutes reasons and 
hence reasonable agreement might vary radically across times and places.”41 The belief that peace is 
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a universal end “irrespective of conflicting interest and politics”42 is soon revealed to be a 
misconception when such abstract principles are applied to a political situation. Instead they are 
mere “transparent disguises of selfish vested interest.”43 For liberals, the settings of ethical 
standards are considered to be formulated independent of politics and instead, they seek to make 
politics conform to these standards. However, such standards are “conditioned and dictated by the 
social order, and are therefore political.”44 According to Carr “ethics must be interpreted in terms of 
politics and the search for an ethical norm outside politics is doomed to frustration.”45  
Rule of Law vs. Political Solutions 
 The actual application of science to the social world was believed to be manifested by the 
rule of law. The idea that adherence to the rule of law could eliminate power from international 
relations is a fundamental belief of the anti-politics of liberalism. According to Morgenthau, “liberal 
philosophy sees in the judicial process the ideal method of settling international conflict.”46 Settling 
international conflict by this method requires the extension of the rule of law to an ever widening 
sphere and the submission of an ever increasing number of human actions to be subjected to legal 
regulation.47 Morgenthau claimed that “persuasion, propaganda, education, scientific proof, and 
democratization of foreign affairs”48 was the means by which governments would place 
international relations under the dominance of the rule of law and “universal treaties became the 
ideal of lawmaking in the international field.” 49 The idea was that more treaties equalled more 
peace. International law was thought capable of regulating international relations to the extent that 
the relations would be rational, free from the supposed irrationalities of war. Eventually, politics 
would be history. Morgenthau argues that: 
 
The rule of law has come to be regarded as a kind of miraculous panacea which, wherever applied, 
would heal, by virtue of its intrinsic reasonableness and justice, the ills of the body politic, transform 
insecurity and disorder into the calculability of a well-ordered society, and put in the place of violence 
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What this belief fails to address are questions surrounding authority, and therefore of enforcement 
in the international realm:  who has the authority to decide what international law is? Who enforces 
this? How are international laws to be enforced?  
 According to Hobbes, “the sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is 
not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleaseth, 
free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him."51 In other words, the 
sovereign is immune from the law.  In the international sphere, the UNSC has the authority to decide 
what constitutes lawful action in order to maintain international peace and security. It is because of 
this authority in the international system that the P5 effectively enjoy immunity.  Furthermore, the 
Council may have the authority to adopt resolutions that dictate what actions should happen in the 
name of peace, but with no overarching enforcer there is no guarantee that these actions will 
happen, and whether these actions would in fact prevent further “violence and bloodshed.” In this 
vein, Carr maintains that:  
 
Law is thus divorced altogether from ethics. It is regarded as binding because there is an authority 
which enforces obedience to it. It is an expression of the will of the state, and issued by those who 
control the state as an instrument of coercion against those who oppose their power. The law is 




Morgenthau and Carr both allude to the liberal assumption that there can be a set formula that 
requires only the prescribed administration once an issue arises in order to settle disputes.  This 
belief does not take into account that different solutions are required at different times. According 
to Thomas G. Masaryk, modern democracy has transformed state organisation from a question of 
power and aim to rule, into a problem of administrative technique.53  Furthermore, C. Delisle Burns, 
democratic principles are “merely principles of science applied to public policy and democracy is the 
discovery of new truth.”54 
 Morgenthau claimed that the liberal conception of the function which the rule of law 
actually fulfils misinterprets reality in three ways: it misunderstand the general relationship between 
law and peace, it overlooks the particular conditions which the rule of law encounters in the 
international sphere, and it presumes that all social conflicts, domestic and international, can be 
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settled on the basis of established rules of law.55 Liberalism, Morgenthau claimed, had been led 
astray by generalising its domestic experience.56  In the domestic setting, when an individual disturbs 
the peace, or two or more individuals are in dispute, a court of law will decide the obligations or 
punishments. Liberal international law assumes that this process can be extended to international 
field.57 However, philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau did warn: 
 
that to discover the rules of society that are best suited to nations, there would need to exist a 
superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without feeling any of them, who 
had no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full, whose happiness was independent of ours, but 
who would nevertheless make our happiness his concern, who would be content to wait in the 
fullness of time for a distant glory, and to labour in one age to enjoy the fruits in another. Gods would 




 Morgenthau criticised the League of Nations for dealing with political situations which 
presented themselves as legal issues. He claimed that when dealing with such situations, the League: 
could deal with them only as isolated cases according to the applicable rules of international law and 
not as particular phases of an over-all political situation which required an over-all solution according 
to political principles. Hence, political problems were never solved but only tossed about and finally 
shelved according to the rules of the legal game.
59
 
There is nothing to indicate that the current functioning of the UN is any different from problems 
with the League of Nations as set out by Morgenthau. Morgenthau described Chamberlain’s belief 
that a piece of paper with Hitler’s peace pledge was a guarantee of peace, as a “tragic symbol of this 
period of intellectual history, which believed in the miraculous power of the legal formula through 
its inherent qualities to drive out the evil and improve the conditions of man.”60 Furthermore, when 
Wilson was on his way to the Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919, he responded to adversaries of 
the League by assuring them that “If it won’t, it must be made to work.”61  
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 The failure of the League, for Carr, “revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis 
for science of international politics.”62 The peace experienced in the Victorian era was 
misinterpreted as being evidence that proved legislation could be a tool to transform the findings of 
liberal ‘science’ into social facts. According to Morgenthau, what liberals believed was a relationship 
of “cause and effect, was actually a coincidence or, at best, took for cause what was actually 
effect.”63 It was the peace and order existing in society at the time which allowed for the orderly 
process of the rule of law, not vice versa. In the words of Carr, “peace between the major powers 
has not been preserved by any process of international legislation... but by the traditional 
procedures of diplomacy, based on the calculation and manipulation of the balance of power.”64 
  It is unsurprising that when theories of liberal democracy were transplanted to countries at 
different times, who were at a different stage of development, and whose practical needs differed 
from those of Western Europe, inevitable dismay ensued.  The impact that liberal tools have had on 
the influence of international relations has led to inevitable disappointments. The inability of the 
UNSC to ineffectively administer impartial legal tools to prevent violence and bloodshed during the 
process of decolonisation is evidence of the erroneous belief that the application of rationalism, 
moral universalism, and the rule of law is all that is required to maintain international peace and 
security.  
 The experiences of Hammarskjöld, in particular the crisis in the Congo, provide an 
illustration of the challenges posed by the political challenges outlined above. The application of 
rationalism, moral universalism, and the rule of law in attempt to remedy a political crisis proves 
inadequate and leads to disappointment.   
 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD 
 The increase in the number of states as a result of decolonization meant that the traditional 
conference diplomacy approach to international relations would be too slow and cumbersome. To 
tackle this problem, then S-G Hammarskjöld insisted upon a dynamic executive action approach. This 
developed from the UN’s understanding of itself as impartial and resulted in the creation of a long-
term policing and managerial role in the decolonized world. The policing and managerial role of the 
UN, as outlined in the preceding chapter, was supposed to incorporate independence from any 
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ideologies and interests of specific states, impartiality between conflicting parties, and the consent 
of the states in which the UN would be intervening, as well as the promise to “only take actions 
necessary to achieve the mandate.”65 Hammarskjöld’s belief that the UN could remain impartial was 
reaffirmed with success of the Peking formula, which he explained as  the S-G’ s right and duty to do 
what he could to help find a peaceful solution when world peace was threatened,66 and with the 
development of successful executive rule during the Suez crisis.  However, this belief would soon be 
tested with the eruption of the Congo crisis.  
 Following independence from Belgian rule, Congolese soldiers revolted against the 
remaining Belgian officers, which led to the dispatch of Belgian troops back into the Congo.  
Congolese President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba wrote impassionedly to Hammarskjöld, 
claiming that Belgium’s decision to dispatch troops was “in violation of a treaty of friendship signed 
between Belgium and the Republic of Congo.”67 Kasavubu and Lumumba requested urgent UN 
military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo from external aggression.  The same 
day, Belgium invaded in the resource rich province of Katanga, purportedly on the grounds of 
ensuring the safety of Europeans. The following day Katanga declared independence with the 
support of Belgian business interests, leading the UN to be faced with competing claimants to lawful 
authority over the province.  
 In response to the crisis, the Security Council adopted Resolution 143, which called upon 
“the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo” 
and authorised Hammarskjöld to “take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of 
the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be 
necessary.”68 Thus, Hammarskjöld, in his role of Secretary-General, was entrusted with discretion as 
to what the necessary steps were, but not in deciding which parties he would liaise with.  Faced with 
competing claimants to authority, Hammarskjöld justified UN intervention by stating that “it was the 
breakdown of those instruments of Government, for the maintenance of law and order which had 
created a situation which through its consequences represented a threat to peace and security.”69 
The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was to be “limited to assisting the Government 
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in the maintenance of law and order and would have no direct functions in relation to the 
withdrawal of Belgian troops.”70  
 Belgium refused to withdraw its troops from Katanga and as a result Katangese authorities 
refused UN troop access to the area. A few days later at a Security Council meeting, Hammarskjöld 
affirmed that Resolution 143 applied to the territory of the Congo has a whole, Katanga inclusive.  
He did, however, reassert that the peacekeeping force deployed could not intervene or be party to 
any internal conflict; therefore, the UN could not intervene in the attempted Katanga secession.71   
 In her study of the crisis, Orford highlights a few situations which illustrate clearly the 
difficulties of adhering to the UN’s impartiality doctrine in practice.  One example of this difficulty 
was illustrated with a decision made by Hammarskjöld’s executive assistant,  Andrew Cordier, who 
for three weeks in 1960 was the acting Secretary-General’s interim special representative to the 
Congo.  Cordier closed all airports and radio stations in Leopoldville after an exchange of broadcasts 
by President Kasavubu and then by Prime Minister Lumumba.  Kasavubu broadcast the dismissal of 
Lumumba and Lumumba responded by broadcasting that his dismissal defied the Parliament and 
people, and that the situation was an internal matter which should not be subjected to external 
interference. A few days prior, Cordier had met with Kasavubu who had warned Cordier of his 
intentions. At the meeting, Kasavubu requested protection by the ONUC, asked that Lumumba be 
denied access to the radio station, and appealed for the closure of the airport to pro-Lumumba 
troops.  
 While the closure of the facilities appeared to be a neutral act, as it applied to both parties, 
it implicitly worked in favour of Kasavubu.  His support base was in Leopoldville while Lumumba’s 
were elsewhere and reachable only by plane. Furthermore, Lumumba was an “effective speaker so 
that depriving Lumumba of so use of the radio denied him a significant political advantage.”72 
Kasavubu also had access to transmitters through his alliance with the President of the Congo-
Brazzaville, allowing Kasavubu to broadcast to Leopoldville anyway. Three days later, “Lumumba 
won the overwhelming support of both houses of the Congolese Parliament, which voted to 
reinstate him as Prime Minister.”73 As this example shows, what could be initially perceived as 
behaving impartially, always produces an inherently political outcome of favouring one side of the 
conflict over the other.   
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 Another situation which the UN was faced with during the crisis was the question of lawful 
authority. The day after Lumumba was reinstated as prime minister, Hammarskjöld declared at a 
Council meeting that the President had the right to revoke the mandate of the Prime Minister. 
Because the UN must recognize the chief of state, and because the chief of the cabinet was in 
opposition with chief of state, the UN was unable to consult any Congolese as doing so would “pass 
judgement on the stand taken by either one of the parties in the conflict.”74 With this in mind, the 
UN now had to decide which authority it would recognise when deciding on whom to distribute aid 
to, by way of a $US1 million grant for food and wages of the Congolese army.  Cordier decided to 
fund Colonel Mobutu who had just been appointed chief-of-staff by Kasavubu.  This effectively 
bought the soldiers “loyalty for Kasavubu and himself and to pave the way for his attempted coup a 
few days later,”75 and forced the UN’s hand in deciding upon legitimate authority. Once Mobutu had 
neutralised the Chief of State, the two rival governments and the Parliament, he called in 
‘technicians’ to run the country, and again, the UN had to “decide which authorities they would 
liaise with in order to administer the country.”76  
 A year later Hammarskjöld reflected on the period concluding that the situation “revealed 
the special possibilities and responsibilities of the Organisation in situations of a vacuum.”77 Yet 
despite the UN’s doctrine of impartiality, the organisation had to make decisions regarding which 
claimant had lawful authority. 78  The insistence that impartiality must be a core principle of 
executive rule meant the UN officials had “no adequate account of the basis upon which they should 
choose one set of internal actors rather than another as the appropriate parties with which to 
engage in practical tasks.79  
 As Orford notes, “the UN was not, and could not be, neutral in the Congo. It was there as an 
actor and its action shaped the political situation.”80  The difficulties the UN faced in the Congo, 
whilst attempting to implement the impartiality principle, continue to rear their head, and have not 
been resolved. Thus, as previously discussed, the impartiality principle appears to be impossible to 
apply in situations of political conflict.  As Carr has stated, “every political judgement helps to modify 
the facts on which it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of political action.”81  The next section 
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will discuss why those difficulties have not been resolved and why for the UNSC impartiality 
continues to be an unattainable goal.  
ARE THESE CRITICIMS REVELANT IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT? 
 The UNSC is charged with the apolitical goal of protecting human life and, in attempting to 
obtain this, it claims to do it impartially. However, as Orford identifies, there are primarily three 
factors that prevent the realisation of a politically neutral Council that seeks to implement the RtoP 
concept. Firstly, the RtoP “grounds authority on the capacity to guarantee protection.”82 Secondly, it 
requires “choosing between competing institutional claimants to authority.”83 Finally, deciding on a 
strategy to maintain and protect life requires decisions about “what protection is required in a 
particular time and place, and who must make the sacrifices in the name of protection.”84  
 The fact that authority is grounded upon the capacity to guarantee protection is problematic 
in the context of neutrality. In order for the UN “to make decisions about authority based upon 
deciding which actor has the will and capacity to guarantee security in a particular territory will 
inevitability involve privileging certain kinds of claimants to authority over others.”85 It raises 
questions such as, why does the capacity to guarantee protection determine who has lawful 
authority? Why is the capacity to guarantee protection above any other method for determining 
lawful authority? Who decided that the capacity to protect determines lawful authority? Answering 
any of these questions relies on some preconceived notion of why the capacity to protect 
determines lawful authority.  Orford notes that deciding who has lawful authority based on the 
capacity to protect “serves to delegitimize those whose claim to power is based on tradition, on the 
capacity to realise spiritual ends or on the realisation of self-determination.”86  Furthermore, 
deciding on who the lawful authority is, based on de facto as opposed to de jure grounds, 
marginalises questions regarding whether the capacity to protect was lawfully acquired, and 
whether or not the authority is fairly representing its subjects.  Answering all of the above questions 
requires intense political engagement, the contours of which the responsibility to protect concept is 
unable to provide. 
  The second reason why neutrality is an impossible goal for the UN to achieve is that it 
requires “choosing between competing institutional claimants to authority.”87 Whatever claimant 
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the UN decides to assist, for example by aid or military assistance, it is ultimately going to have an 
impact on the internal politics of the state, thus rendering it a partial arbitrator to the conflict.  
 Finally, “deciding which techniques to use in maintaining order and protecting life can never 
be apolitical, neutral or impartial.” 88 Techniques include security sector reform, the use of force, and 
redistribution of property. The administrators who decide which techniques to use will base their 
decisions on something that they believe they are upholding or promoting, whether it is the 
protection of a population by the redistribution of welfare or the preservation of existing 
entitlements.89  
 
 This chapter has examined the inherent problems with attempting to reconcile the 
impartiality principle with the responsibility to protect concept, and the inevitable impossibility of 
political neutrality.  It has provided an overview of the liberal origins relating to sovereignty, as well 
as the evolution of scientific thought and the implications it has had in the political realm. The 
emphasis liberal theorists place on rationalism does not take adequate consideration of the state of 
human nature; in particular, it does not address man’s lust for power. Politics Among Nations, 
Morgenthau contended that a political policy will always enviably either seek to “keep power, to 
increase power, or to demonstrate power.”90 Taking this understanding of power in the context of 
the RtoP doctrine, it is clear that the P5 members of the UNSC are involved in a struggle to keep, 
increase and demonstrate their power.  Carr and Morgenthau have both provided liberal critiques 
and have argued strongly that the liberal concepts of rationalism, moral universalism, and the rule of 
law are not always capable of solving political conflicts.  
 What this means for the UNSC, as an institution founded upon those principles, is that 
expectations of what it stands for, and what it is capable of achieving,  are in need of serious 
reconsideration and recalibration. Particularly, its inability to act impartially needs to be properly 
appreciated. The idea that it acts impartially, or that it is even  possible for it to do so, is flawed and 
only results in an heightened expectation of what it can achieve, which time and again wavers and 
fails to live up to its grandiose tenets. This is most apparent on two levels. Firstly, the procedures of 
the Security Council itself do not lend themselves to the impartiality principle. This will be discussed 
in further detail in Chapter Four, with an analysis of Council reform efforts. Secondly, as discussed by 
Orford, there are structural difficulties in any attempt to apply the impartially principle in conflict 












situations. It is impossible for the UN, as an actor, to avoid shaping political situations. Even in 
situations where it is claiming to be acting impartially, it inevitably changes the course of the conflict 
by intervening in the conflict.  Situations where the UN claims to be treating both parties to a conflict 
as equals, and therefore impartially, are routinely found to be falsehoods, and it is often discovered 
that one or more parties are being advantaged, to the detriment of other parties, by the UN’s 
actions.  This case of the 2011 Libyan intervention exemplifies the challenges of achieving political 





CHAPTER 3: THE CASE OF LIBYA 
 Rebellion against the 42 year reign of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi began on the evening of 
15 February 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring. In the Libyan case, protests erupted outside the 
headquarters of a police station in Libya’s second largest city, Benghazi, following the arrest of a 
human rights lawyer. However, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the non-violent protests in Libya were 
met with an immediate brutal crackdown by the Libyan government. In a swift and rare move, just 
11 days after protests began, the UNSC had managed to find consensus and unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1970 under Article 41 of the UN Charter.  The same day, Libyan rebels formed the 
National Transitional Council (NTC).  The terms of the Security Council Resolution 1970 included an 
end to the violence, an imposition of an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an assets freeze of the 
Qaddafi family and selected government officials. Most significantly, it referred the situation to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), despite the fact that Libya was not party to the Rome Statute, the 
treaty which had established the ICC.  Only a few days after the referral, the prosecutor of the ICC, 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, announced the opening of the investigation in Libya, making it the fastest 
preliminary examination in the history of proceedings at the ICC.1 After its adoption, Secretary-
General Ban-Ki Moon personally phoned Qaddafi in the hopes of persuading him to comply with the 
conditions of resolution.2 When it was clear that there would be no cooperation, the Council quickly 
moved into further action. 
 In the early weeks of March 2011, it appeared that the rebel army may be crushed by 
Colonel Qaddafi’s forces. The rebels were surrounded in Benghazi, and reports were coming in of a 
possible rebel defeat. As a result of this, the UNSC reconvened to discuss the evolving situation and 
the increasingly dire humanitarian crisis.  On 17 March 2011, the Council adopted Resolution 1973 
which passed with ten votes in favour, and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the 
Russian Federation.) The primary aspects of the Resolution included the further denunciation of 
systematic human rights violations, the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter in order to establish a no-fly zone, and the authorisation for states to take all necessary 
measures to have these measures enforced.3  Two days later, the US and European allies launched 
operation Odyssey Dawn.  The US-led coalition launched air and missile strikes against Libyan forces 
and destroyed Libya’s air defence system within 72 hours. Following the success of Operation 
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Odyssey Dawn, the US “sought NATO’s agreement to take over command and control of the 
operation in order to ensure effective integration of allied and partnered militaries.”4  Consequently, 
on 27 March 2011, Operation Unified Protector was created, under NATO auspices, comprising of 
“three separate tasks: policing the arms embargo, patrolling the no-fly zone, and protecting 
citizens.”5 By 21 August 2011, rebels had seized control of the capital Tripoli, and within two months 
the NTC had secured primary control of the country.  On 19 October 2011, rebels seized Sirte and 
executed Colonel Qaddafi, and by 31 October 2011, Operation Unified Protector came to an end. 
 
 As previously outlined, the UN unanimously adopted the RtoP concept at its 2005 World 
Summit and identified the UNSC “as the primary conduit for the application of the use of force in 
situations of gross violations of human rights.”6 Six years later, the UNSC decision which had 
sanctioned the 2011 Libyan intervention was hailed by many as a successful first test case for 
translating the RtoP concept into practice.7  In response to Resolution 1973, Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon stated that “the Security Council today has taken an historical decision, Resolution 1973 
affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its 
responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government.”8 
Similarly, Alex Bellamy argued that Resolution 1973 set a precedent for the UNSC in the sense that 
“it will not be inhibited as a matter of principle from authorizing enforcement for protection 
purposes without host state consent,”9  and Thomas Weiss claimed success in Libya would “put 
teeth in the fledgling RtoP doctrine.” 10    
 When force is declared to be employed for humanitarian purposes, such as in the case of 
Resolution 1973, it is always proclaimed to be under the pretext that human protection is an 
apolitical goal.  However, what proponents of RtoP fail to sufficiently recognise is that deciding to 
intervene on humanitarian grounds, where there is the inevitable likelihood of civilian death and/or 
displacement, is inherently a political decision. In the case of Libya, the tools employed to implement 
the RtoP doctrine, namely the ICC referral and no-fly zone, were presented  as impartial measures to 
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counter the violence of the Qaddafi regime, yet those tools were decided upon and administered by 
“the quintessential political body: the Security Council.”11  
 Interestingly, throughout the conflict, there had been a reluctance to call the situation a civil 
war.12 If it had been deemed so, UNSC intervention would have been perceived as a breach of 
Libya’s sovereignty and a violation of the UN Charter. However, politicians refrained from using the 
term and the situation was portrayed as conflict with an obvious aggressor and a population that 
required saving, as opposed to a civil war where both belligerents committed violent and unjust acts. 
This made room for the implementation of the RtoP doctrine, as the conflict was framed so that 
there was an apparent clear friend (the Libyan population, including the rebels) that required saving 
from a seemingly clear enemy (the Qaddafi regime). 
 This chapter will explore the UNSC’s behaviour surrounding the 2011 intervention in Libya 
and highlight the implications such actions have on both the desirability and the possibility of 
political neutrality. It will begin by examining universal values and the RtoP in the UNSC’s response 
to the crisis, namely the adoption of Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973. Following this will be a 
discussion on the problems of UNSC authority and how it relates to political biases and preferences, 
followed by a discussion on the problem of selectivity. This chapter will conclude with a discussion 
on how politics lay at the heart of decision making in the case of Libya, and how such behaviour has 
had serious repercussions for any expectation that the UNSC can act as an impartial arbiter of when 
humanitarian interventions can occur. 
 
THE RtoP AND UNSC RESOULTION 1970 AND 1973 
 The 2011 Libyan intervention was significant as it was the first situation in which the UNSC 
invoked and directly referenced the RtoP norm to justify intervention.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the RtoP concept “grounds authority on the capacity to guarantee protection,” which raises 
the question of who has the rightful authority to decide the criteria for such capacity and protection.  
In the Libyan intervention, the UNSC decided that Qaddafi did not have the will or capacity to 
guarantee protection or security within Libya, and gave NATO a mandate to effectively exercise the 
authority to decide upon who to protect in Libya, how protection should be administered, and who 
exactly should exercise the protective measures. Aside from grounding the concept of authority on 
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the capacity to protect, the RtoP doctrine requires “choosing between competing institutional 
claimants to authority.”13 While the proclaimed purpose of Resolution 1973 was “to end the 
violence, to protect civilians and to allow the people of Libya to determine their own future,”14 the 
UNSC and NATO made an implicit decision to back the NTC over Qaddafi, by implementing the no-fly 
zone against Qaddafi’s air force, which in-turn directly took the decision-making authority away from 
the Libyan people.  Furthermore, the RtoP concept requires decisions on which techniques to use in 
maintaining order and protecting life. Any claims of humanitarian action tend to result in states 
implying impartiality and the transcendence of national self-interest. In the case of Libya, this was 
especially evident in two key elements: the ICC referral, and the establishment of the no-fly zone, 
which are both represented and perceived as neutral measures. While these elements are logically 
dependent on a neutral decision making body, they are sanctioned by the inherently political UNSC, 
which further highlights the problem of impartiality in the UN system.   
Resolution 1970: referral of the case of Libya to the International Criminal Court 
 As previously mentioned, on 26 February 2011 Resolution 1970 was unanimously adopted, 
only eleven days after protests erupted. Amongst other provisions, it condemned the violation of 
human rights, imposed targeted sanctions, and referred the case of Libya to the ICC. The Libyan 
referral is of particular significance as it was the first case in which the UNSC referred a situation to 
the ICC that was “expressly associated with the RtoP concept.”15  In order for the UNSC to enforce 
international human rights, it requires the RtoP doctrine to prevent and cease human rights 
violations, and the ICC seeks to punish human rights violators. 16 The efficacy of both is dependent on 
the Council, as is the manner in which the RtoP and ICC are operationalized.17 Therefore, while the 
ICC is “presented by its advocates as a legal bastion immune from politics,” 18 the dependence on the 
Council means that it is inherently political. The ability of the P5 to refer and defer cases, as well as 
block their own prosecution, reinforces the dominance of the political in international relations as “it 
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recognizes these powers as the foundation for international legal reform and yet accepts that they 
themselves operate beyond the reach of the law that they make.”19 This ability of the P5 is 
reminiscent of Carr’s assertion that the “law is therefore the weapon of the stronger.”20 
 Of the P5 members, France and the UK are both state parties to the Rome Statue; Russia and 
the US have signed but not ratified; and China is a non-party state.  Despite the fact that not all P5 
members are state parties to the ICC, the UNSC can still veto any related decision to refer an issue to 
the institution.  What was unique about Resolution 1970 was that it was the UNSC’s first unanimous 
referral to the ICC, as well as the first time it “referred a situation to the ICC in the early stages of an 
ongoing conflict and as part of a resolution containing a comprehensive plan to try to end it.”21 
Eleven weeks after the referral, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) filed applications for warrants of 
arrest for Muammar Qaddafi, Saif Qaddafi, and the Head of Intelligence in Libya, for crimes against 
humanity, making it the shortest time in which the OTP had requested an arrest warrant following 
the initiation of an investigation.22 At that point, the only other referral (Resolution 1593) the 
Council had made to the ICC concerned the conflict in Darfur in March 2005. The conflict there had 
already been raging for two years and had been described by then Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland as an “ethnic cleansing,”23 
illustrating the gravity of the crisis. It is worth mentioning two points: first, like Libya, Sudan is not a 
state party to the Rome Statue; and second, France, Russia and the UK voted in favour of ICC 
intervention in Darfur, while the US and China abstained.  
 After the passage of Resolution 1970, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Susan Rice, 
stated that "the United States and all the members of the Council felt that what is transpiring is 
absolutely unacceptable and demanded an urgent and unanimous response."24  Other than 
mentioning that the Council had “unanimously referred an egregious human rights situation to the 
International Criminal Court,” Rice gave no justification as to why the US agreed to do so. This is 
noteworthy, as the US had abstained from voting on Resolution 1593 on the grounds that it 
“fundamentally object[ed] to the view that the Court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the 
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nationals, including government officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute,”25 and that it 
believed that “the Rome Statute is flawed and does not have sufficient protections from the 
possibility of politicized prosecutions.”  While a response to the differing US views regarding the two 
ICC referrals could be that the resolutions were decided upon under different US presidencies so 
making it unsurprising to have two different outcomes or justifications, it could be argued that if the 
ICC was really ‘immune from politics’ then who holds the presidency of the US should be irrelevant.   
 Like the US, China also abstained from voting for Resolution 1593, but voted in favour of 
Resolution 1970. China’s former Permanent Representative to the UN, Li Baodong, made no 
mention of the ICC after the Resolution 1970 passage, stating that they voted in favour due to “the 
special situation in Libya at this time and the concerns and views of the Arab and African 
countries.”26 However, after the adoption of Resolution 1593, the Permanent Representative of 
China, Wang Guangya stated that reasons for abstaining were that China “cannot accept any 
exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction against the will of non-State parties, and we would find it difficult to 
endorse any Security Council authorization of such an exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.” 27 
 The inconsistency between China and the US’s voting behaviour between the two 
resolutions can either be viewed as acts of self interest, or a new principled acceptance and belief in 
the ICC. Unsurprisingly, Associate Trial Lawyer to the ICC, Karen Corrie argues in favour of the latter, 
explaining that the referral demonstrated a marked shift in the international community’s regard for 
the ICC and showed that “members of the Council, even those who have not ratified that Statute, 
view the ICC as a legitimate and valuable institution that can contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”28 However, it could alternatively be argued that the inconsistency 
of Chinese and US voting behaviour for each of the Resolutions highlights the selectivity of the 
Council.  While the voting behaviour surrounding Resolution 1953 may have been portrayed as a 
principled decision to respect the jurisdiction of states, the voting behaviour of Resolution 1970, 
suggests that the results in both situations were an outcome of the individual P5 strategic interests 
at the time. 
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 Further P5 hypocrisy regarding the ICC is evident in the vetoing of a draft resolution in May 
2014 that would have referred the situation in Syria to the ICC.  In this instance, Vitaly Churkin, 
Russia's Permanent representative to the UN, had earlier dismissed the vote as a "publicity stunt" 
and warned that if the resolution had passed it would “hinder efforts to end the country's three-year 
war.”29  Yet, Russia supported both the Libyan and Darfur referral to the ICC. While it could be 
argued that the Libyan referral happened extremely quickly after protests broke out and therefore 
had a better chance of a peaceful result, the conflict in Darfur had been raging for two years. In 
addition, The Guardian reported that the US only “agreed to support the draft resolution after 
ensuring that Israel would be protected from any possible prosecution at the ICC related to its 
occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights.”30  The protection of Israel is an example of the pursuit of 
justice being made “subservient to political interests.”31 The double-standards displayed by the US 
and Russia in these instances is further evidence of a selective Council that is primarily concerned 
with its own self-interests, and is therefore unable to act impartially. As Louise Arbour argues, the 
entanglement of justice and politics prevents the ICC from holding any “credibility and legitimacy as 
a professional and impartial substitute for deficient national systems of accountability.”32  
 The ICC is “intended to promote impartiality, since in a conflict situation both government 
and oppositional military forces can commit international law crimes.”33  In other words, the court is 
geared towards overcoming the politics and partiality of sovereign states. However, in order for it to 
do so, it must rely on a neutral decision-making body, not the inherently political UNSC. Additionally, 
according to Michael J. Struett, “the ICC is an institution with significant powers to regulate the ways 
that states or other groups use force and to punish individuals who violate these international 
laws”34  However, for the ICC to exercise its powers, it must attain the permission of the P5. 
Therefore, while it could potentially regulate some states, if all P5 members agree, the P5 are 
effectively immune, which in effect negates from the idea of an institution capable of overcoming 
the politics and partiality of sovereign states. Furthermore, Jennifer Welsh has argued that the 
strategy of “naming” in Resolution 1970 by the UNSC was a deliberate act, which was “first, to 
change the incentives of those who were in a position to commit atrocities against civilians; and 
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second, to encourage defections that might contribute to the fall of Qaddafi’s regime.”35 
Manipulating incentives and encouraging defections that might contribute to regime change clearly 
favours a particular side and is therefore problematic for the espoused impartiality rhetoric from the 
UN.  Moreover, as Resolution 1970 demonstrated, the RtoP doctrine and international criminal 
justice cannot be separated from political considerations when they are administered by a political 
body such as the UNSC. 36 Finally, the Council’s inability to generate any consistency in the manner in 
which it refers cases to the ICC simply reinforces their own power in the international system, to the 
detriment of weaker states, who are ultimately held accountable to a higher standard under 
international law. This raises the question, “can law ever function to depoliticize international 
relations, or is it forever beholden to the political preferences of the powerful?”37 
Resolution 1973: No-Fly Zone 
 After the adoption of Resolution 1970 and the continued violence in Libya, some members 
of the international community, including regional organisations, rallied together and called for a no-
fly zone over Libya.  According to Alexander Benard, “the term ‘no-fly zone’ is used to describe a 
physical area of a nation that is patrolled using airpower of another sovereign state or coalition,”38 
with the main purpose of denying an enemy the use of a designated airspace as well as the ability to 
“monitor enemy ground positions and movements within the zone.”39  If any aircraft enter the no-fly 
zone without permission or “do not leave immediately upon demand, they will be engaged by the 
enforcing aircraft.”40 Furthermore, the monitoring aspect also includes working in “cooperation with 
friendly forces on the ground or acting unilaterally against any emerging threats.”41  Similarly to the 
dependency of a neutral decision-making body regarding ICC referrals, the very idea of a no-fly zone 
is dependent on a neutral enforcement power that maintains the right to fly in the zone, which is 
still nonetheless labelled a no-fly zone. 
 The events leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1973 began on 1 March 2011 when a 
non-binding resolution was passed by the US Senate, which condemned the violence committed by 
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the Qaddafi regime, and suggested that the UNSC consider a no-fly zone.42  In a joint statement on 
March 7, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) demanded that the UNSC take the necessary steps to 
protect civilians, including a no-fly zone in Libya.43 Illuminating the significance of the unravelling 
situation in Libya to the GCC, this demand was the first substantive foreign policy position taken by 
the regional group since 1991.44 Around this time, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and 
Libyan Interim Transitional National Council also publicly endorsed a no-fly zone.45 Likewise, in an 
unprecedented move on March 12 2011, the League of Arab States (LAS) also called upon the 
Council to establish a no-fly zone. While this was seen as a remarkable step, it is noteworthy that 
“only eleven of the twenty-two members of the LAS were present at the meeting, and a majority of 
the eleven were also members of the GCC that had called for the establishment of a no-fly zone only 
five days earlier.”46  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon added weight to the growing international 
chorus, and urged the international community to undertake a rapid response to protect Libyan 
civilians from further violence, and furthermore asked the Council to agree to protective measures 
that would ensure the safety of the Libyan population.47  
 On 17 March, the Council responded with Resolution 1973 which was submitted by France, 
Lebanon, the UK and the US.  It has been variously described as an example of “the humanitarian 
imperative and the normative power of global civil society and specifically RtoP,”48  as well as an 
example of “US imperialism and the West’s thirst for oil.”49  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
stated that “the Security Council today has taken an historic decision. Resolution 1973 affirms, 
clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to 
protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government.”50 This was viewed 
as an extraordinary measure as it was the only time that the UNSC had authorised the use of military 
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force for human protection purposes, in the face of clear opposition of a functioning state. 
Resolution 1973 was also unprecedented in the sense that, as well as a lack of host state consent, 
“diplomacy produced a decisive response in a relatively short period of time.”51  
 While the action was deemed by former French Foreign Minister, Bernard Koucher, as a 
“minimum countermeasure” to the violent actions of Qaddafi’s forces,52 criticisms of the airstrikes 
were voiced early on in the intervention, with some arguing that the strikes went beyond the 
mandate, and that the lines between civilian protection and regime change were blurring.53 
However, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon defended NATO’s actions stating that “Security Council 
resolution 1973, I believe, was strictly enforced within the limit, within the mandate."54  
Furthermore, he claimed that the defeat of Qaddafi and subsequent regime change “were done by 
the people, not by the intervention of any foreign forces, including the United Nations.”55 
 Amongst the criticisms, at a meeting of the South African Cabinet on 30 March, 2011, the 
South African government called for an “immediate ceasefire and for restraint to avoid further 
casualties,” further stating that “if you read the resolution itself, you will see it is very clear about no 
military intervention or foreign occupation of Libya.”56 Likewise, amidst the intervention in May 
2011, James Pattison suggested that there was evidence of mission creep, stating that “it appears 
that as the intervention progresses, the primary objective may become regime change rather than 
the protection of civilians.”57 Theo Neethling stated that “in the case of Libya, it soon transpired that 
Western powers...also believed that a no-fly zone required certain military actions... to protect the 
planes and the pilots, including bombing targets like the Libyan defence system.”58 Forewarning of 
the ramifications that mission creep in Libya produced, South African Permanent Representative to 
the UN, Baso Sangqu stated at the 2011 UNGA debate that:  
 
My delegation has expressed its condemnation of recent NATO activities in Libya which went far 
beyond the letter and spirit of resolution 1973 adopted by this Council. Abusing the authorization 
                                                          
51
 Welsh, "Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP." Pg 255 
52
 Theo Neethling, “Reflections on Norm Dynamics: South African Foreign Policy and the No-Fly Zone over 
Libya,” South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 1 (April 1, 2012): 25, 
doi:10.1080/10220461.2012.670381. 
53
 Glanville, “Intervention in Libya,” 338. 
54
 Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. Chief Defends NATO from Critics of Libya War,” Reuters, December 14, 2011, U.S. 





 Neethling, “Reflections on Norm Dynamics,” 26. 
57
 James Pattison, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya,” Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 03 
(September 2011): 273–274, doi:10.1017/S0892679411000256. 
58





granted by this Council to advance political and regime change agenda’s does not bode well for future 
action by this Council in advancing the protecting of civilians agenda. This could lead to a permanent 




In a similar vein, President of the Russia Federation, Vladimir Putin, expressed his strong 
condemnation of the perceived unlawful expansion of the Resolution 1973 mandate. He told 
reporters that he believed that the Resolution was both “defective and flawed,”60 and furthermore it 
was a “sort of call to crusade when someone would appeal to someone to go to a certain place and 
free someone else.”61 It was quickly evident that some members of the UNSC felt deceived by the 
mission creep they felt was conducted by the US-led coalition, and ultimately NATO. There was a 
strongly held belief that the Resolution had been nefariously misinterpreted and misused by the 
Western members of the P5. The decisions taken by the Western members of the UNSC seriously 
undermined all consensus that had been built on how to respond to the Libya crisis, and many UNSC 
members, particularly Russia, were determined to make sure that they were not deceived in the 
same manner again.  
  
THE PROBLEMS OF UNSC AUTHORITY AND LIBYA 
 The Libyan intervention was arguably sanctioned as a result of a “unique constellation of 
necessarily temporal factors.”62 The unusual clarity of the situation, coupled with a direct request 
from regional organisations, such as the LAS and the African Union (AU), were crucial elements in 
acquiring a mandate in order to sanction action. This is considered the vital element that led to 
Russia and China abstaining rather than vetoing Resolution 1973.  In this section I will examine more 
closely the differing political interest of the P5 members, in attempting to explain the rationale 
behind their decisions to pass Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Ultimately, I will argue that the self-
interest of the P5 was the reason behind their decision to intervene in Libya. 
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Various Political Interests of the P5 
 Understanding how the Council reached this unprecedented decision requires an 
examination of the P5 voting behaviour.  The somewhat typical P3 (France, UK and US) and P2 (China 
and Russia) split was evidenced in the sanctioning of Resolution 1973 where the P3 voted in favour, 
and the P2 abstained.  Of the states who voted in favour, their proclaimed reasons for doing so 
included: the championing of democracy; the protection of civilians against crimes against humanity; 
action against the lack of adherence to Resolution 1970; a response to the call from regional 
organisations; the demonstration of rights and duties pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and 
the self determination of the Libyan people. French Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Alain 
Juppe, claimed that “the international community has reacted in near unanimity,”63 citing regional 
groups such as the European Union, the LAS, and the AU, and that “we must not allow the rule of 
law and international morality to be trampled underfoot.”64 Similarly, the British Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant, commented on the apparent influence of the 
international community, stating that “international opinion has looked to the Security Council to 
act,” and expressed that the central purpose of Resolution 1973 was: 
 
 to end the violence, to protect civilians and to allow the people of Libya to determine their own 
future...The Libyan population wants the same rights and freedoms that people across the Middle 
East and North Africa are demanding and that are enshrined in the values of the United Nations 
Charter. Today’s resolution puts the weight of the Security Council squarely behind the Libyan people 




US Permanent Representative to the UN, Susan Rice expressed her view that “the Council’s purpose 
is clear – to protect innocent civilians,” and that “the future of Libya should be decided by the people 
of Libya. The United States stands with the Libyan people in support of their universal rights.”66 The 
image being promoted by the P3 Council members was that there was a universal condemnation of 
the crisis in Libya, and a united international front against the tyrannical and freedom hating Libyan 
government. The P3 members were also keen to foster the image that the humanitarian crisis was 
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the primary reason for intervention, and largely avoided any references to the need for regime 
change at the hands of UN or NATO (rather leaving this to the will of the Libyan people). 
Furthermore, the situation was never deemed a civil war, and instead was framed within the RtoP 
narrative.  This image required a clear aggressor and a population in need of protection so that 
intervention could be considered acceptable, and to avoid accusations of a breach in Libya’s 
sovereignty.  
 
 Despite their traditional non-interventionist foreign policies in the UN context, Russia and 
China chose not to invoke their veto powers. Their official reasons for not voting in favour for 
Resolution 1973 included the lack of clarity over the terms of engagement and the risk of further 
destabilization of an already volatile area. The request for action from the LAS and AU were, 
however, the crucial factors that led to abstention, rather than an outright veto.67  Russia and 
China’s decision to refrain from invoking their veto powers in this situation was something that 
proponents of RtoP claimed to be as in indication of the acceptance of the emerging norm.68 
 China’s decision to abstain from voting was based upon “the special circumstances 
surrounding the situation.”69 Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Li Baodong stated that 
“the Security Council should follow the United Nations Charter and the norms governing 
international law, respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and 
resolve the current crisis in Libya through peaceful means,” and furthermore that “China is always 
against the use of force in international relations.”70 However, in the end Baodong explained that the 
Chinese decision to not block the Resolution with their veto power had been particularly influenced 
by the call for the establishment of a no-fly zone over the Libyan airspace by the LAS, as well as the 
similar position taken by African countries and the AU.71 
 Russian Permanent Representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, explained that Russia’s 
decision to abstain from voting, rather than actively voting to support it, was due to the fact there 
were many unanswered questions about implementation, such as how the no-fly zone would be 
enforced and agreement on the limits of engagement. Churkin stated that the Russian preference 
was for there to be an immediate ceasefire, as there was an urgent need to avoid further 
destabilisation of the region.72 He also expressed his concern at the changing nature of the 
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Resolution, noting that “the draft was morphing before our very eyes, transcending the initial 
concept as stated by the League of Arab States. Provisions were introduced into the text that could 
potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.”73 Churkin advised that in the end 
Russia did not block the veto because of the common humanitarian values that it shared with the 
international community. In an explanation of Russia’s position on the Resolution, Churkin explained 
that Moscow firmly advocated for the protection in Libya, “guided by this principle as well as by the 
common humanitarian values that we share with both the sponsors and other Council members, 
Russia did not prevent the adoption of this resolution.”74 
 
 An examination of the politics of the P5 leading up to the intervention may also illuminate 
some of their true motivations underlying the sanctioning of the no-fly zone.  According to Michael 
Walzer, an analysis of Russia and China’s decision to abstain from Resolution 1973 reveals that the 
decision was primarily in service of their self-interest. Walzer claims that Russia and China felt that it 
was the best possible outcome of the situation; that it was an option which suited their interests in 
the Middle East and Africa.75 In the case of Russia, there were substantial economic interests 
working as a motivating factor for Moscow to remain engaged in the UNSC’s response to the crisis. 
Some reports have put Russian investment into Libya, before the height of the crisis, as high as 
US$70 billion,76 with significant commercial interests ranging from oil and gas contracts, to railway 
and infrastructure construction.77 By abstaining from the voting on the Resolution, Russia was 
attempting to carefully calibrate and balance its response to the crisis. While Russia had vocally 
expressed its concerns with some of the tenets of the Resolution (namely in relation to the limits of 
engagement and enforcement), it wanted to continue to be influential, and to be seen as a 
constructive arbitrator to the crisis. Should Russia have blocked the Resolution, by invoking its veto 
privilege, it is likely that the other Western P3 members of the UNSC would have reacted by 
attempting to sideline Moscow from future cooperation on the crisis. Furthermore, it is highly likely 
that the P3 would have proclaimed that Russia’s vetoing was the nefarious actions of an actor only 
observant to its own self-interest, in the face of an ever growing humanitarian crisis.  
 Indicative of the balancing act that Russia was attempting to navigate, there were persistent 
rumours that the ruling elite in Moscow had disagreed on how to respond to the draft Resolution. It 
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has been claimed that while then-President Dmitry Medvedev wanted the Russian Federation to 
vote in favour of the Resolution, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov strongly insisted on vetoing the 
proposal.78 In the end, it is likely that decision to abstain was a calculated assessment of Russia’s self-
interest, and a compromise between the two opposing views amongst political elites in Moscow. 
Once the decision to abstain from the vote was announced, President Medvedev was quick to put 
down any internal opposition. In a bold move, Medvedev dismissed the then-Russian Ambassador to 
Libya, Vladimir Chamov, for “the misrepresentation of Russia’s position in the Libyan conflict.”79 
Chamov had reportedly condemned Medvedev’s decision not to veto the Resolution.80 When 
Medvedev was asked by reporters why Russia had not used its veto power, the President reinforced 
the calculated decision taken by Moscow:  
 
Russia did not use its power of veto for the simple reason that I do not consider the resolution 
in question wrong. Moreover, I think that overall this resolution reflects our understanding of events 




 China’s decision to abstain rather than invoke its veto powers can also be arguably owed to 
calculations of self-interest, rather than altruistic motives. It is noteworthy to begin by commenting 
that Libyan officials from Qaddafi’s regime travelled to China to purchase US$200 million worth of 
rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, portable surface-to-air missiles designed, along with other 
weapons from state controlled companies in July 2011, despite the Resolution 1970 arms embargo. 
While the Chinese government confirmed the visit, they claimed they were unaware of negotiations 
taking place between the weapons manufacturers and Qaddafi’s officials.  This is despite that fact 
that documents to that effect were found printed on the paper of a government procurement 
department in a neighbourhood where many government officials lived, before the defeat of 
Qaddafi.  According to Omar Hariri, the chief of the rebel’s military committee, the completion of the 
deal could explain how brand-new weaponry had reached the battlefield.82 Yet, a spokeswoman for 
the Chinese Government claimed that no contracts had been signed and no weapons were 
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exchanged.83 Assuming the likelihood that the weapons trade went ahead, Beijing’s proclaimed 
humanitarian objectives for deciding to refrain from using the veto are highly questionable. One only 
need to briefly mention the ongoing controversy surrounding Tibet, and China’s prevailing concern 
over its oil supply in Darfur while mass atrocities were occurring.  In part, China’s traditional 
approach to stick steadfastly to state sovereignty and non-intervention is a result of their own 
international actions. In other words, in order to avoid action against themselves, they avoid directly 
challenging other states on these matters. 
 Another reason why China may have chosen to abstain is arguably related to Beijing’s 
interest in maintaining closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh strongly supported the overthrow 
of the Qaddafi government, with Qaddafi accusing Saudi Prince Abdullah of “making a pact with the 
devil,”84 in relation to Saudi support of US military action in the region. Abdullah retorted by bluntly 
responding, “your lies precede you and your grave is in front of you.”85 For China, Saudi Arabia has 
become an increasingly close international partner, as well as an influential aid donor. Following the 
2008 Sichuan earthquake, Saudi Arabia was the largest international relief donor, and it has recently 
outstripped the US as the biggest oil importer from the Arab State.86 The Chinese Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi even went as far as justifying China’s decision to refrain from exercising the veto as 
being, in part, due to Beijing’s “attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and 
African Union.”87 In light of Saudi Arabia’s influence, particularly in the GCC and the LAS, it is 
conceivable that Beijing found itself unwilling to be the sole cause of the failure of the passing of the 
UNSC resolution. As with the Russian case, it appears that the choice by China to abstain from voting 
was more of a calculation of self-interest, and an assessment of the current geopolitical context, as 
opposed to any overriding altruistic or humanitarian considerations.  
 
 The self interest displayed in deciding to refrain from exercising the veto is not limited to the 
P2. The Western P3 also had self-interested motivations at the forefront of their minds when 
deciding how to approach the Libyan crisis. While the US voted in favour of Resolution 1973, it was 
not always so keen to do so. At the beginning of March 2011, it was reported that President Obama 
had showed no willingness to support a no-fly zone, and instead wanted to increase US support for 
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humanitarian assistance, and enforce an assets freeze.88 Defence Secretary Robert Gates and 
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon had questioned whether Libya was even critical to US 
national security interest’s calculations, “thus positing the traditional realist objection to 
humanitarian intervention.”89   
 Over the course of the next couple of weeks, however, the US administration changed its 
position. The change, according to some reports, had been directly attributed to Obama’s personal 
view on the protection of civilians.90 According to Vaughn and Dunne, why the US worked so hard to 
find consensus to ensure the vote was won can be understood in relation to the localised variant of 
the RtoP, which is the US governments focus on genocide and mass atrocity prevention/protection 
(GMAPP).91  While the GMAPP shares similar tenets to the RtoP, its differentiating point is its focus 
on US national security priorities. In other words, the GMAPP is the “domestic adaption” of the 
RtoP.92 The US Governments GMAPP focus was an attempt to “confront past policy failures”93 such 
as its failure to act in Rwanda and Darfur, and its delayed responses to the Bosnian and Kosovo 
atrocities, which “weakened its credibility and legitimacy as a supporter of humanitarian values.”94  
In order to improve its reputation, the US saw Libya as an opportunity to renew its commitment to 
multilateralism and mass atrocities prevention.95  Once the US had swung its position towards a 
substantially greater role in Libya, particularly in the form of establishing and policing the no-fly 
zone, the personal campaign to get other states on sides by Obama and his Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Susan Rice kicked into overdrive. According to reports, Rice strongly 
lobbied Portugal, Brazil and Russia in particular, while Obama personally phoned South African 
President, Jacob Zuma, telling him that the passing of the Resolution was a “personal priority.”96 
Obama similarly discussed the US position directly with then-Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, 
as well as French President Nicolas Sarkozy.”97 Explaining why the US ultimately decided to intervene 
in Libya, Obama addressed the US public and outlined the administrations reasoning for its changed 
approach: 
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We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition 
prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people 
themselves. We had had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American 




Aiden Hehir claims that Obama’s world view comprises of a pragmatic assessment of individual cases 
rather than his adherence to a law or principle.99 This assessment of individual cases and has 
ultimate implications for the reputation of the UNSC which is already subjected to accusations of 
selectivity and partiality. The US decision to intervene in Libya demonstrates the inherent self 
interests of states, as it appears the primary reason for intervening was to remediate its past foreign 
policy failures. 
  
After a UNSC presidential speech on 22 February 2011 condemning the violence in Libya, the 
UK and France took the opportunity to spearhead the efforts gearing towards the Libyan 
intervention. For the UK, it provided an opportunity to take the lead in drafting Resolution 1973. A 
delegate from a large non-permanent member of the UNSC at the time stated that “the UK and 
France were very active in showing that they had the moral high ground and [they were] the good 
guys supporting the Libyan people.”100 As the US were not so readily keen on the idea of a no-fly 
zone, on the evening of 15 March 2011, UK officials sought “a compromise formula that would meet 
American objectives without offending the Arab League, which refused to have Western boots on 
the Libyan ground.”101 After gaining US support, the conflict continued to be carefully framed within 
the friend/enemy dichotomy.  The US took advantage of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s seat at the UNSC 
with one US delegate asking “Do you want another Srebrenica?” The Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Permanent Representative allegedly replied “I know what airstrikes can do, I was there, but 
eventually it did bring peace.”102 However, Cameron’s humanitarian motives are questionable given 
the fact that he had to be advised that there was no legal basis to bomb the main oil refinery 
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supplying Tripoli because Resolution 1973 specified that ‘all necessary measures’ could only be 
taken to protect civilians.103  
What is even more damning is the recent release of over 3,000 emails from the US State 
Department, which included an email sent to Hilary Clinton in April 2011 with the subject line of 
“France’s client and Qaddafi’s gold.”104 The email identifies five reasons why France decided to lead 
the attack on Libya: a desire to gain a greater share of Libya oil production; increase French influence 
in North Africa; improve his (Sarkozy) internal political situation in France; provide the French 
military which an opportunity to reassert its position in the world; and address the concern of his 
advisors over Qaddafi’s long term plans to supplant France as the dominant power in Francophone 
Africa.105 As the subject line suggests, Qaddafi’s gold was of most interest, with his gold and silver 
reserves estimated at approximately 140 tons each.  This was believed to pose a threat to the French 
franc which was circulating as a prime African currency.106 A direct quote from the email states the 
following: 
 
This gold was accumulated prior to the current rebellion and was intended to be used to establish a 
pan-African currency based on the Libyan golden Dinar. This plan was designed to provide the 
Francophone African Countries with an alternative to the French franc (CFA). (Source Comment: 
According to knowledgeable individuals this quantity of gold and silver is valued at more than $7 
billion. French intelligence officers discovered this plan shortly after the current rebellion began, 
and this was one of the factors that influenced President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to commit France 




Even though the US had information that the French had significant self-interest involved, they still 
moved forward with the Resolution, as it was in the US interest to have the French on-side, even if 
their motivations were highly questionable.  
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 The above analysis demonstrates that self-interest could at least be construed as a primary 
factor for all P5 members when the UNSC authorised intervention in Libya in 2011. When the self 
interest of the P5 is at play, Council selectivity is always going to be inevitable. The question that 
follows, therefore, concerns the implications of selectivity have for the UNSC in its desire to act in a 
politically neutral manner.  
The problem of selectivity  
  For some advocates of intervention, the problem that the case of Libya highlighted was not 
that the intervention occurred, but that there was no comparable action in other similar crisis 
situations. In the context of the Arab Spring, governments such as Bahrain, Egypt, and Israel engaged 
in violence towards their citizens, yet the UNSC failed to respond.  Early on in the Libyan intervention 
Obama alluded to the problem of selectivity when he insisted that “America cannot use our military 
wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure 
our interests against the need for action.”108  His assertion illustrates the primacy of US national 
interests for US decision-makers, and provides further evidence of why political neutrality is 
impossible to achieve.  
 James Pattison argues that selectivity in intervention is not morally problematic per se, but 
rather, it is the basis of which the selection is made upon that determines whether intervention is 
morally just.  He argues that the problem in Libya was “that the coalition chose to intervene in Libya 
rather than in response to even worse situations where it could have saved more lives.”109 
Therefore, selectivity is ethical if decisions on where to intervene is based on considerations of 
where the most lives can be saved. However, this notion of moral selectiveness is problematic due 
to the uncertainty that surrounds intervention.   
 While the idea of moral selectivity that is based on saving the greatest number of lives is 
theoretically sound, it is virtually impossible to implement in practice. It is impossible for the P5 to 
be in the position to have the information required to determine how many lives will be saved or 
lost in situations of both intervention and non-intervention. Because of this, it makes Pattison’s 
notion of moral selectivity difficult to achieve, and therefore renders selectivity as an irremediable 
problem. Even if the P5 were in a position to have all the information required to know how many 
lives would potentially be saved or lost, the disposition of states dictate that this would still have to 
be measured against their national interests. While this would make it clearer when deciding 
whether intervention is ethical or not, it still does not actually constrain the power of the P5, so they 
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are therefore free to intervene in accordance with their own political interests. As Orford states, the 
RtoP doctrine “provides a discretionary mandate to undertake executive action in order to further 
the goal of protecting civilians,” and that the “mandate has unapologetically been exercised in a 
selective fashion.”110  
 In addition, Hehir argues that the implementation of RtoP is “ultimately dependent on 
whether the members of the P5 have a collective interest in – or are at least not opposed to – 
halting a particular looming or actual mass atrocity.” 111  So while the ethics of selectivity may 
prescribe a standard for what is acceptable P5 intervention, it does not change the inherent 
disposition of states.  Selectivity is unavoidable. The reliance that the RtoP has on the alignment of 
P5 national interests makes political neutrality an impossibility. As Hehir and Lang state, “RtoP 
entrenches the very structural problems that have contrived to produce the poor record advocates 
of RtoP sought to redress.”112 The RtoP enforces the current world order which allows the P5 to 
selectively intervene as their biases and preferences dictate, while failing to maintain the protection 
of individuals. Therefore, the selective application of the RtoP doctrine illustrates the challenges of 
achieving a politically neutral UNSC. 
 
 The Libyan intervention demonstrated that political neutrality and impartiality are 
impossible to achieve via the UNSC. The referral to the ICC was geared towards overcoming the 
political partiality of sovereign states, yet it was used by the members of the UNSC as a political tool 
to primarily serve their own self interests. As the case of Libya demonstrated, “the RtoP and 
international criminal justice cannot be sheltered from political considerations”113  The UNSC’s ability 
to refer and defer cases highlights the “lack of credibility, impartiality and independence towards a 
Court that many hoped would transcend state politics.”114 The air campaign illustrated that the 
nature of the UN’s involvement has shifted “from one of genuine (or at least professed) impartiality 
– a hallmark of the UN’s original approach to peacekeeping – to one of taking sides.”115  The UNSC’s 
ability to sanction a no-fly zone was premised on the idea that there would need to be a neutral 
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enforcement power. However, the supposed neutral power (NATO) necessarily maintained the right 
to fly in the zone which is nonetheless a ‘no-fly zone.’    
 Jennifer Welsh argued that the text of Resolution 1973 states “not only about the protection 
of civilians but also the protection of civilian populated areas.”116  Accordingly, this choice of words 
suggests that the UNSC was “effectively inserting itself in the ongoing struggle, putting certain cities 
out of bounds for Qaddafi and his forces.”117 While it is understandable to focus on civilian-
populated areas, it nonetheless moved the UNSC away from the impartiality principle by aiding one 
side and restricting the movements of the other. Furthermore, NATO’s wide interpretation of 
Resolution 1973 has led critics to claim evidence of mission creep. As Welsh argues, “the by-product 
of this creep towards partiality is that the ambition of the military mission no longer matches the 
narrowly circumscribed political objective of civilian protection.”118   The texts of both of the Libyan 
resolutions move away from impartiality, she suggests, by identifying “particular individuals as the 
targets of action, both in terms of sanctions and international criminal justice.”119 
 Thomas Weiss forewarned that if the intervention in Libya went “badly” critics would 
redouble their opposition, and future decision would be made more difficult.120  The subsequent 
Syrian civil war illustrates this point; the resulting Council inaction has suppressed hopes of an 
international community that is determined, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated after the 
adoption of Resolution 1973, “to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated 
upon them by their own government.”121  Allegations of mission creep by NATO have arguably 
produced a backlash within in the UNSC against any further UN intervention in internal affairs of 
other states for the foreseeable future.  The defeat of Qaddafi has led Russia and China to rule out 
any parallel resolution with regard to Syria. At the time of writing, the UNSC has drafted 11 
resolutions on the Syrian conflict, eight of which were adopted, and four of which were vetoed by 
China and Russia.  The UNSC’s use of its Chapter VII powers has been erratic, and dependent on the 
assent of each member of the P5. The intervention in Libya again illustrated the centrality of the P5 
and the pervasive influence of the whims of these states.122  Whether anything can be done to 
address this problem of political partiality is the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: IS UN REFORM POSSIBLE?  
 The current devastation in Syria and lack of action on the part of the UN is often referred to 
as evidence of a UNSC that is in desperate need of reform.  As previously mentioned, criticisms the 
Council faces include accusations of paralysis, lack of impartiality, selectiveness, hypocrisy, as well as 
strong condemnation for being undemocratic and unrepresentative. In 2005, former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan declared that “the UN must undergo the most sweeping overhaul of its 60-year 
history. World leaders must recapture the spirit of San Francisco and forge a new world compact to 
advance the cause of larger freedom.”1  Ten years later, the world is still awaiting the return of the 
‘San Francisco spirit.’  
 The only change to the Council’s configuration occurred in 1965 when the number of non-
permanent UNSC seats was extended from six to ten, which is now indicative of its current 
composition. Despite the lack of any further reform action in the UN’s seventy year history, the idea 
of reforming the UNSC is still widely discussed and supported. However, exactly how reform should 
take shape is largely contested and there are countless proposals for change. The key areas of 
contention include: support for the enlargement of the Council but no agreement on the number of 
new members, the extent of the new members powers; which states would be the top candidates to 
join an expanded Council; and most controversially, the issue of altering the power of the veto.2 A 
near constant theme running through all reform proposals is that “the Council’s legitimacy is in peril 
unless the body can be reformed to account for recent changes in world politics.”3 These changes 
are due to developments in the geopolitical arena, the international system, and in international 
norms.  Changes in geopolitics have seen a shift in the distribution of military and economic powers 
since the Council’s founding in 1945. Systemic changes have resulted in a dramatic increase of UN 
members as a result of decolonisation and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Normatively, there is a 
stronger push given today to valuing diversity, equity and representation.  
 This chapter addresses the question of whether Council reform is possible. It will provide an 
overview of the leading proposals, but will primarily focus on the two leading proposals that call for 
veto restraint; the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) group’s Code of Conduct and 
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the political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities, the latter of which is 
spearheaded by France and Mexico.  Finally, this chapter will examine whether proposed reforms 
are capable of transcending the politics of the UNSC, and will continue to explore whether 
impartiality is desirable or even possible.  
PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION 
 At the 2013 UNGA General Debate, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, a strong advocate for 
the expansion of the UNSC, expressed that “the recurring polarization between permanent members 
generates a dangerous paralysis,” and furthermore “only with the expansion of the number of 
permanent and non-permanent members and the inclusion of developing countries in both 
categories will correct the Council’s deficit of representation and legitimacy.”4 The following section 
outlines a number of the leading and current proposals for Council expansion. 
 The 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed two 
reform models that were later endorsed in the In Larger Freedom report the following year. Model A 
in the report provides for six new permanent member seats with no veto power which would be 
divided into the major regional areas as follows:  Africa (2), Asia and Pacific (2), Europe (1), Americas 
(1). In addition to these permanent seats, three new non-permanent and non-renewable seats for a 
two year period would be added, bringing the number of total non-permanent seats to 13. The new 
non-permanent seats would be divided among the major regional areas as follows: Africa (4), Asia 
and Pacific (3), Europe (2) and the Americas (4). This would bring the total number of seats of the 
Council to 24, with six seats each representing the four major regional areas.5Model B does not 
propose the expansion of permanent seats, but instead proposes to expand the number of non-
permanent seats from 10 to 19. Of the 19, eight will be four-year renewable-term seats and two 
seats are to be held by each of the four major regional areas. The 11 remaining seats will be two-
year non-renewable seats and divided among the four major regional areas with 2 seats per area. In 
addition, one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major 
regional areas as follows: Africa (4), Asia and Pacific (3), Europe (1) and the Americas (3). Likewise 
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with Model A, this brings the total number of seats of the Council to 24 with six seats each 
representing the four major regional areas.6 
 In September 2004, the representatives of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (G4) issued a 
joint statement calling for the need of a Council that is “expanded in both the permanent and non-
permanent categories, including developing and developed countries as new permanent members.” 
They maintained that this was required due to the “four-fold increase in the membership of the 
United Nations since its inception in 1945.”7 Specifically, the group seeks to expand the Council to a 
total of 25 seats, by adding 6 permanent seats without veto power and four non-permanent seats. 
Collectively known as the G4, each state supports each other’s candidature for permanent 
membership as well as an African permanent membership. Each of these states agrees to forgo the 
veto privilege. There is, however, a provision for the review of extending the veto to the new 
members after 15 years. The G4 also propose to expand the number of non-permanent seats to 14, 
bringing the total number of seats in the Council to 25. Benjamin MacQueen claims that the G4 
proposal is the “most promising alternative to the existing structure of the UNSC.”8 
 Uniting for Consensus (UfC),9 also known as ‘the Coffee Club’, is a counter group to the G4 
who seek the expansion of non-permanent member seats to 20. Their premise is based on their 
resentment of a “select few breaking free of their current second-rank status in the world body.”10 
Some members of this group claim they are motivated by principle, asserting that “the very 
existence of permanent membership is wrong, and have no desire to compound the original sin by 
adding more members to a category they dislike,”11 while others are reportedly motivated by 
“competition, historical grievance, or simple envy.”12  
 In March 2005 the African Union (AU) released the Ezulwini Consensus which contained yet 
another set of reform proposals for various UN organs. On the subject of the UNSC, it proposed that 
the Council be expanded to 26 seats, which would include with six new permanent members with 
the right of veto and five new non-permanent seats. The AU asserted strongly that there should be 
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no less than two African permanent sets.13 MacQueen claims that this proposal is currently “the 
most visible alternative to the G4 expansion plan.”14 The Ezulwini Consensus is an argument against 
the G4’s non-extension of the veto privilege. Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa were initially the 
loudest proponents who worked towards generating an African consensus that would see at least 
one majority Muslim state gaining a permanent seat.15 
 These four sets of proposals represent the current leading propositions for the expansion of 
UNSC membership, through which they are all seeking to inject a greater sense of fair representation 
and balance in the Council, reflecting the changes to the geo-political arena since 1945. However, it 
is increasingly the case that reform discourse is focused strongly on restraining the powers of the 
current permanent members, as opposed to the expansion of the Council’s membership. Primarily, 
reform efforts have been focused on the use of the veto power by the P5 members. 
  
VETO RESTRAINT 
 Of all of the proposals for reforming the power of the veto, two similar initiatives have 
recently gained considerable traction: the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico initiative. 
These two proposals have prompted the #restraintheveto campaign which, according to Aidan 
Hehir, is being “retweeted, liked and shared” and is “one of the most visible and fast-spreading 
social media campaigns in the UN’s history.”16  Despite his recognition of the popularity of the 
‘hashtag’ campaign, Hehir is candid in his criticism of the initiative, noting that popularity does not 
equate with the campaign making any sense. The #restraintheveto campaign was launched by the 
Global Centre of the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) in January 2015, after four UNSC resolutions 
regarding the current crisis in Syria were vetoed by Russia and China. GCR2P believe and assert that 
“when the world needs the UN Security Council to respond to genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing, the five permanent members...have a responsibility not to use their 
veto.”17  
 The idea of veto restraint was voiced in 2001 when then French Foreign Minister Hubert 
Védrine suggested that the P5 voluntarily refrain from using their veto power when dealing with 
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mass-atrocity crimes where their own national interests were not involved. 18The 2001 ICISS report, 
which promoted the principle of the RtoP, similarly suggested that the P5 refrain from using the veto 
“in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions 
authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise 
majority support.”19  In the 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, there was also a recommendation that the P5 refrain from using their veto 
“in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.”20 According to former Canadian Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy and former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Allan Rock, there were 
attempts to discuss veto restraint during the negotiations of the RtoP principle in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document. Axworthy and Rock claim, however, that this discussion was 
abandoned because “fierce P5 opposition forced negotiators to drop the demand or risk losing 
approval for R2P altogether.”21  Examples such as this shed light on the inherent difficulties present 
in any attempt to change the current power wielded by the P5 members. 
 This section will examine the two leading veto restraint initiatives that the #restraintheveto 
social media campaign is based on.  The ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican political 
declaration do not directly challenge the legitimacy of the veto, but rather allege current misuse of 
it.  Furthermore, the initiatives are designed as political commitments, which would not be legally 
binding. They seek to change the behaviour of the P5, rather than to redefine their powers.22  
Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the UN, Christian Wenaweser, explained in a press 
conference that the ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican initiative are complementary; 
both initiatives pursue the same goals, and they are mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, he stated 
that ACT was encouraging all states that have subscribed to their text, to also sign the political 
declaration put forward by France and Mexico. The major point of difference between the two 
proposals is that the ACT Code of Conduct is directed at all states, whereas the French/Mexican 
political declaration specifically targets the P5. Wenaweser explained that the ACT initiative was “not 
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meant to be a code of conduct or gentlemen’s agreement among the P5 members of the SC, but it is 
a commitment from all states when they serve on the council.”23  
ACT Code of Conduct 
 The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group formally launched the Code of 
Conduct on 23 October 2015 to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the entry into force of the UN 
Charter.  The group first emerged in 2005 after the release of the UN World Summit Outcome 
Document. While the document did not make any recommendations on the use of the veto, it did 
recommend that the Council improve its working methods so that it could become more transparent 
and accountable. In response to this recommendation, in late 2005, Costa Rica, Jordan, 
Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland formed a group known as the Small Five (S5), in the 
endeavour to tackle the Council’s working method problems. In order to avoid paralysis, the group 
formulated a number of proposals to improve the working methods of the UN that could be passed 
by a single majority of the General Assembly, and furthermore avoided any proposals that would 
require a two-thirds majority, such as changing the composition of the Council. 
 In 2012, the S5 boldly drafted General Assembly resolution L.42 Rev. 2 which specifically 
targeted the P5, calling upon them to, firstly, circulate a written rationale to all UN members, 
explaining how its use of the veto is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, 
and secondly, refrain “from using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.” 24 Unsurprisingly this proposal resulted in a 
strong reaction by the P5 and the non-permanent members of the Council. The P5 made it clear that 
the Council should decide on its own working methods and that it was the P5’s decision alone to 
take.25 Behind closed doors, the P5 undertook a unified approach, and collectively endeavoured to 
discourage states from voting in favour of the draft resolution, which happened to coincide with 
“the much-publicized confrontation between Russia (and in its tailwind China) on the one side, and 
the Western permanent members on the other, over the Council’s response to the civil war in 
Syria.”26 For example, it has been reported that China placed pressure on African countries to not 
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vote in favour of the resolution, while the P3 pressured the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Legal 
Affairs and UN Legal Counsel, Patricia O’Brien, to consider making the resolution require a two-thirds 
majority to pass in the GA.  O’Brien subsequently announced that, due to its importance, instead of 
a simple single majority, the resolution would require the two-thirds majority in the GA.27  While this 
would make it more difficult for the S5, there was also other forces as play attempting to discredit 
the draft resolution. According to Volker Lehman it was “a tactical manoeuvre by the UfC group in 
the run-up to the vote,”28 that finally caused the S5 to withdrawal the resolution, before the formal 
vote even took place. Initially, the UfC had been supportive of the S5 proposal, but as it became 
clear that the G4 also supported the S5, the UfC decided to withdraw its support and in doing so, 
would have prevented a successful vote taking place. 29 Political wrangling and the battle for the 
maintenance of power ascendency, which is inherent in the UN system, in the end saw the death of 
the draft resolution. 
 Only hours before the draft resolution was due to be deliberated and voted on in the GA, it 
was dropped, or as Thalif Deen eloquently put it “the resolution unceremoniously disappeared from 
the hallowed precincts of the United Nations.”30 According to a developing-nation diplomat who told 
the Inter Press Service under a condition of anonymity, the S5 withdrew the draft resolution because 
they “came under intense pressure from the P5, both in New York and in the capitals.”31  Assuming 
this is true, the ‘disappearance’ of the resolution unsurprisingly demonstrates that the P5 dictate the 
actions and proceedings of the Council. According to Lehmann, the S5’s failure represents “first and 
foremost a show of force on the part of a P5 determined to maintain their control over the 
representation of member states interests and the reform agenda at the UN.”32  
 On the other hand, Stephen Zunes argues that despite the P5’s power, “they are coming 
under increasing challenge, their credibility is weakening, and their moral failure is becoming 
increasingly obvious to an ever larger majority of the international community.”33 Zunes argues that 
in blocking the reform, the P5 may “have done untold damage to the credibility of the Security 
Council”34  and as a consequence more countries may refuse to comply and may even completely 
bypass the Council.  However, the fallout experienced as a direct consequence of the blocking of the 
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S5’s resolution seems rather minimal, if not nonexistent. The Council’s credibility has already been 
questioned, time and time again. In the eye of many UN member states, the credibility of the P5 has 
been, for some time, broken. The blocking of the S5 resolution is hardly likely to cause the ‘untold 
damage’ that Zunes claims may happen. The fact of the matter is that the credibility problems of the 
P5 are systemic and are already well advanced and understood. It is unlikely that the quashing of the 
resolution was a surprise to many in the corridors of New York. 
 Despite the fact that the draft resolution was seemingly withdrawn under pressure, the 
support base for the S5 grew. Indeed, in a speech on 24 April 2013, the Swiss UN Permanent 
Representative, Paul Seger, stated that the decision to withdraw draft resolution L.42 Rev.2 was “not 
an end, but a starting point for a new approach.”35  In May 2013, the ACT group, which originated as 
a group of five small states, officially launched with a membership of 27 states36 that are committed 
to “working to improve the accountability, coherence and transparency of the UN Security 
Council.”37 ACT would work separately from the already established Intergovernmental Negotiations 
on Security Council reform (IGN), as IGN addresses the broader reform issues of the Council, 
including enlargement and composition, whereas ACT proposes initiatives that maintain the 
Council’s current composition. It places an emphasis on improving the current composition of 
Council, implying no further Council expansion, as the reform proposals discussed in the preceding 
section suggest. 38   
 Amongst the provisions of the Act Code of Conduct is a pledge “not to vote against a 
credible draft resolution before the Security Council on timely and decisive action to end the 
commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes.”39 Here, 
it encourages all members of the Council, not just the P5, to refrain from voting according to the 
above types of resolutions. Furthermore, the Code invites, 
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 the Secretary-General, making full use of the expertise and early-warning capacities of the United 
Nations System, in particular the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office on 
Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, to continue to bring situations that, in her or 
his assessment, involve or are likely to lead to genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes to the 




In sum, the application of the Code of Conduct can subject to the assessment of a particular 
situation by either a committed state or the S-G. 
 
 On 1 October, 2015, at the ACT Group Event on the Code of Conduct at the UN, the UK 
declared that it would sign up to the ACT Code of Conduct.  Ambassador Matthew Rycroft of the UK 
Mission to the UN stated that “I’m glad to say that the UK has not used our veto since 1989. I am 
proud to say today that we will never vote against credible Security Council action to stop mass 
atrocities and crimes against humanity.”41 Rycroft claimed that the Code of Conduct helps increase 
“the political cost to those who do use their veto to block the way.”42 He referred to Syria as yet 
another “collective failure” and “stain on our conscience” and blamed the “narrow self-interests of 
some” for the ongoing crisis.43 Furthermore, he warned that the lack of action in Syria had 
“consequences for the Security Council and indeed the United Nations as a whole.”44 As of 23 
October 2015, 105 member states and 1 observer have signed the Code of Conduct.45 
The application of the code would be determined by the “facts on the ground,” and “subject to the 
assessment of a particular situation by a state that has expressed its commitment to the Code of 
Conduct,” rather than a specific procedural trigger. Furthermore, in the spirit of Article 99 of the UN 
Charter, the S-G is invited to bring to the attention of the Council what he or she determines to be a 
current or foreseeable mass atrocity situation.  Here, the S-G avoids having the sole decision-making 
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burden as its role is of importance but is not the determining voice,46 unlike the burden the role 
carries with the French/Mexican declaration, to which I now turn my attention. 
French/Mexican Declaration 
 A similar initiative to the ACT Code of Conduct was voiced at the 68th UNGA debate in 
September 2013, when French President François Hollande proposed that “a code of good conduct 
be defined by the permanent members of the Security Council, and that in the event of a mass crime 
they can decide to collectively renounce their veto powers.”47 On 4 October, French Foreign Minister 
Laurent Fabius published an Op-Ed in The New York Times, where he strongly criticised the Council 
for inaction in Syria, stating that “for all those who expect the United Nations to shoulder its 
responsibilities in order to protect populations, this situation is reprehensible.”48 He then expanded 
upon what Hollande had proposed at UNGA a few weeks prior, noting that while France was also in 
favour of enlargement of the UNSC, he recognised that the international community was still far 
from reaching an agreement that would progress efforts in that direction. In the meantime, France 
proposed that the P5 “voluntarily regulate their right to exercise their veto.”49 There would be no 
change to the UN Charter; rather it would be “implemented through a mutual commitment from the 
permanent members.”50 The process would be triggered firstly, by 50 member states voicing their 
concerns, secondly, the S-G would provide his or her opinion, and finally, the code of conduct would 
immediately apply. Recognising the self-interests of states, and attempting to circumvent the 
immediate rejection of the initiative by the other P5 members, Fabius stated that “to be realistically 
applicable, this code would exclude cases where the vital national interests of a permanent member 
of the Council were at stake.”51 Fabius claimed that by taking such action the Council would preserve 
its credibility and “it would prevent member states from becoming prisoners of their own principled 
positions.”52 
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 Fabius and the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, José Antonio Meade Kuribreña and 
Kuribreña’s successor, Claudia Ruisz Massie, met in the margins of both the 2014 and 2015 UNGA 
debates to discuss the issue of the veto. Prior to the 2015 Ministerial meeting, France launched a 
‘Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocity,’ stating that:   
 
...the Security Council should not be prevented by the use of veto from taking action with the aim of 
preventing or bringing an end to situations involving the commission of mass atrocities. We 
underscore that the veto is not a privilege, but an international responsibility. In that respect, we 
welcome and support the initiative by France, jointly presented with Mexico, to propose a collective 
and voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to the effect that 




 On 20 September 2015, Fabius and Massie hosted an event in the margins of the 70th UNGA 
entitled “Regulating the Veto in the Face of Mass Atrocities.” Other participants included, Sidiki 
Kaba, Minister of Justice of Senegal and the President of the General Assembly of States Parties to 
the Rome Statue of the International Court, and Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights 
Watch. In addition, a joint statement was released and circulated during the meeting by Human 
Rights Watch, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Amnesty International, the 
International Federation for Human Rights, and the World Federalist Movement.  Furthermore, ten 
states delivered statements in support of the proposal (Czech Republic, France, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, The Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, and Tunisia.)   
 A document published on France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website entitled Why France 
wishes to regulate use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council, states that:  
 
France envisages the possibility of giving the United Nations Secretary-General a key role, in the spirit 
of Article 99 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ascertain the existence of mass atrocities, the 
United Nations Secretary-General would decide to refer the matter to the Security Council either on 
his own initiative or on a proposal from the High Commissioner for Human Rights or from a certain 
number of Member States, which France proposes setting at 50.
54
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While the S-G’s role of bringing to the attention to the Council any matter he or she deems 
necessary is identical to that of the ACT Code of Conduct and the spirit of Article 99 of the UN 
Charter, the proposal that the occurrence of a mass atrocity be determined by 50 or more Member 
States is unique. The ultimate goal of the initiative is to avoid paralysis, yet the process of getting 50 
member states to agree and then request that the S-G take action is likely to be a “time-consuming 
and bureaucratic process” 55  which could arguably prevent timely responses to cases of mass 
atrocity situations. Furthermore, the French/Mexican proposal has been criticised for placing too 
much pressure on the S-G to be the ultimate moderator of the initiatives application. In doing so, it 
reinforces the politicization of the S-G role which already occurs by virtue of Article 99.   
 Gareth Evans proposes three sets of conditions that he believes are required in order for all 
P5 members to subscribe to the French/Mexican initiative. These conditions are namely scene-
setting conditions, clarifying conditions, and protective conditions.  Firstly, he claims that the correct 
scene-setting conditions include a general international agreement that there is a “powerful case to 
be made both ethically and in terms of the proper discharge of the Security Council’s functions 
under Article 24 of the UN Charter;”56 the “issue is real” and that using the veto would inhibit the 
Council’s action of which the majority are in support of; and that “a purely voluntary commitment is 
worth having.”57  The importance Evans places on general international agreement is evidence of 
Carr’s assertion regarding the liberal erroneous belief that “public opinion can be relied on to judge 
rightly on any question rationally presented to it.”58 How can we be sure that public opinion is 
always ethically right?  As Hehir argues, “a blanket call for automatic restraint...misses the fact that 
draft resolutions may well be ill-conceived to the point where they need to be vetoed.”59  The 
uncertainty that is unavoidable in intervention makes it impossible to know whether action would 
be for the better or for the worse. Public opinion can be so frivolous and easily manipulated that it is 
dangerous to rely upon it when deciding on the most ethically sound option.  
 Secondly, Evans argues that the following ‘clarifying conditions’ require P5 agreement in the 
following areas:  on an initiating mechanism; on how the veto restraint agreement should be 
described; on kinds of cases to which the veto restrain agreement applies; on a trigger process for 
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determining when an appropriate case for applying the veto restrain agreement has arisen; and 
finally, on the kinds of Council action to which the agreement applies. In order to clarify these 
conditions, inherently political questions would need to be addressed. Evans is correct in pointing 
out that the proposal is lacking a few parameters.   For example, the proposal fails to stipulate what 
exactly constitutes a mass atrocity crime. Could a perceived threat be enough to trigger a restrain 
the veto situation? Does a certain death toll need to have been reached? Is a stated intent, such as 
Qaddafi’s call to “cleanse Libya house by house,”60 sufficient criteria? What happens if the P5 
disagree on whether a certain crisis has reached the restrain the veto situation level? Unfortunately, 
Evan’s suggestion that the kinds of UNSC action that could apply could be “just to resolutions 
authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes as ICISS originally proposed,”61 is 
dangerous and opens further doors to RtoP abuse.    
 Thirdly, Evans argues that agreement on the following ‘protective conditions’ is required to 
gain P5 support:  namely in response to the fact that P5 members will not be bound by the veto 
restraint agreement in certain circumstances; and that the veto restraint agreement will be reviewed 
after experience of its operation.  What is most short-sighted about these protective conditions, 
namely the national interest exception clause, is that it simply reinforces and reaffirms the existing 
system that the proposal seeks to change. Is it not the original protective condition, the veto, the 
crux of the issue here? How is providing the P5 with even further protection going to actually change 
anything?  As Hehir argues, it would not be difficult for Russia to claim that it does have vital national 
interests at stake in Syria given that: “its only Mediterranean naval base is at the Syrian port of 
Tartus; it has and continues to sell offensive weaponry to Syria; and Russian oil company 
Soyuzneftegaz has signed huge contracts with the Syrian Oil Ministry since the crisis began.”62 
According to Stewart M. Patricks, the current situation in Syria is evidence that the national interest 
is already at play and questions whether “the Russians and Chinese have already in fact defined 
coercion against the government of Bashar al-Assad as contrary to their national interests,”63 which 
is evidenced by their continuous blocking of UNSC resolutions on the current crisis.   
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CRITIQUE OF THE VETO RESTRAINT PROPOSALS 
 What is most interesting about the veto restraint proposals is that two of the permanent five 
members are willing to advocate and even spearhead the initiatives. This calls the question of why 
would any member of the P5 be interested in relinquishing their power? It could be argued that the 
commitment to restrain the veto is an example of “unconscious reflexions of national policy based 
on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time,”64 rather than a realisation of 
some kind of moral enlightenment.  It is highly unlikely that France and the UK would have been 
agreeable to such initiatives while they were both considered global hegemons, and supremely 
relevant in the international area, as opposed to today’s current political climate where they have 
lost the power and relevance they once enjoyed when the UN was first established. One idea why 
France decided to spearhead the Restrain the Veto campaign was that it is weary of its fading 
relevance within the P5 and wanted to be perceived as maintaining some form of higher morality 
over its permanent counterparts. The same could be argued about the UK’s willingness to subscribe 
to the Code. In a January 2016 article in The Guardian, Former UK Permanent Representative to the 
UN from 1998 – 2003, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, stated that the was “not so much a power any more, 
our relative power has faded...the number of armed forces has gone down, our contribution to 
peacekeeping is negligible, we haven’t succeeded in our interventions in Iraq, in Afghanistan.”65 
Does the UK’s subscription to the Code actually reflect the relative weakness of those P5 members 
who support veto restraint? It certainly could it be argued that the willingness of both permanent 
members is an attempt to wield some type of normative power, in lieu of their hard power they 
once enjoyed. 
 Of the other permanent members who have yet to agree to the initiatives, Russia has 
unsurprisingly been the most publically vocal in its opposition to the veto restraint initiatives. On 11 
August 2015, Lavrov tweeted that “ideas of scrapping or limiting the #UNSC veto power have been 
voiced before. We think they have no future.”66 As for the US, it has publicly refrained from 
expressing its views on the proposals, but privately “it has reportedly expressed its reservations on 
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veto restraint to diplomats from other member states.”67 Meanwhile, China has been 
characteristically reticent, making no comment on any of the proposals.  
 In a similar case to the Council, there are also opposing views amongst the UNGA. As 
previously mentioned, many states have already supported the veto restraint initiatives. Some states 
are going so far as to base who they vote for in regards to non-permanent membership on who 
supports the initiatives. Yet, there are some states which have expressed concern that the emphasis 
on veto restraint will hinder the broader Council reform agenda. Their belief is that the proposals are 
too ambitious, and could stifle meaningful, albeit less far reaching, change. In the opposing camp, 
there are states that do not think the proposals have gone far enough; some states argue that 
proposals should be extended from mass atrocity situations to include veto restraint in regard to 
Secretary-General selection and requests for UN membership.68 The differing views on how UNSC 
reform should take place illustrate the difficulties in finding the consensus required to achieve such 
an ambition. However, such an achievement is still foremost dependent on the desires of the P5. 
 
 Advocates of veto restraint believe that a more impartial UNSC is one which refrains from 
exercising the veto in mass atrocity situations. In their view, a veto restraint agreement is a 
necessary measure to ensure that the Council upholds its commitment to the RtoP doctrine.  This 
would mean, in a practical sense, that the Council would be more likely to authorise the use of force 
and refer perpetrators to the ICC, thus promoting human rights while punishing human rights 
violators. Current criticisms surrounding inaction in the cases of Syria, Israel/Palestine, and the 
Ukraine, are only a few examples of, according to RtoP proponents, a selective Council that is failing 
to uphold its RtoP commitment and act impartially.  Advocate for veto restraint and Founding 
Steering Committee member of the International Coalition for the RtoP, William Pace, has gone so 
far to argue that the ‘misuse’ of the veto was responsible for millions upon millions of deaths.69 
However, the assumptions of veto restraint advocates are based on two flawed premises: firstly, 
that intervention necessarily saves more lives than non-intervention; and secondly, that restraint of 
the veto is, in itself, an impartial action.  Furthermore, the proposed reforms raise a number of 
issues.  Do they adequately address the issue of impartiality? How likely is veto restraint or Council 
expansion, considering the primacy state motivating factor of self-interest? What even constitutes 
an impartial P5? Is a more impartial Council actually desirable? And most importantly, is a more 
impartial Council even possible?  
                                                          
67









 In order to answer these questions, an acceptance of the primacy of self-interest, and that 
there is not always a solution to a deemed problem, is required. What actually requires adjustment 
is the conception that politics can be fixed, in order for expectations of what the Council is actually 
capable of achieving to be shifted.  In the current contemporary international arena, it would seem 






 Exploring political neutrality within the context of the UNSC is more important and relevant 
than ever.  The protracted conflict in Syria has entered its sixth year and has aided to the rise of the 
Islamic State, and to the biggest refugee crisis the world has seen since World War II.  The current 
Council deadlock around the Syrian conflict has fuelled the traction that the current veto restraint 
proposals are gaining.  However, the current veto restraint proposals fail to sufficiently address the 
drivers and limitations of state behaviour, and are therefore doomed to failure.  By adequately 
addressing the drivers and limitations of state behaviour, there will be a better understanding of 
what is required for successful UN reform. 
 This thesis has explored the desirability and possibility of political neutrality within the 
context of the UNSC. Specifically, a critique of liberalism was applied to the case of the 2011 Libyan 
intervention and to the current proposed UNSC reform efforts, particularly those concerning the 
restraint of the veto.  It has demonstrated that ever since the UN’s inception, adherence to the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality were inevitably going to be highly challenging, primarily due 
to the inherent disposition of states and also to the very structure of the Council itself.  While RtoP 
was initially lauded as a liberal remedy to the problems facing the Council, the cases of Libya and 
Syria have illustrated that the promulgation of the RtoP doctrine was not the solution to achieving 
politically neutrality, nor the solution leading towards an effective and credible Council.   
 The belief that such a solution can exist is based on the liberal premise that the application 
of rationalism, moral universalism, and the rule of law to a political situation is what is required to fix 
a perceived social problem. This belief has distorted expectations of what is possible to achieve in 
the international political realm, and is exemplified in the belief that RtoP has the capacity to solve 
conflict situations. The 2011 Libyan intervention illustrated that this belief is not the reality and 
instead highlighted the centrality of the P5 and the pervasive influence of the whims, drive by self-
interest, of these states.  It revealed that the apparent ‘impartial’ tools, namely the ICC referral and 
the establishment of the no-fly zone, are actually political tools that necessarily serve the interests of 
the P5.  The resulting allegations of mission creep committed by NATO has arguably produced UNSC 
backlash against any further UN intervention in regional affairs for the foreseeable future, as the 
case of Syria is currently demonstrating.   
 The response to Council deadlock has included the veto restraint proposals which are 





means of reason.”1 In other words, the proposals suggest a remedy (veto restraint) that is to cure 
the disease (Council deadlock and selectiveness; politics) and are presented as a ‘rational formula 
acceptable to all.’  However, because the veto restraint proposals have failed to adequately consider 
the cause of the ‘disease,’ their prescribed ‘remedies’ are doomed to fail. The veto restraint 
proposals identify the problems of the Council and focus on how states ought to behave, while 
failing to adequately address the drivers and limitations of state behaviour.  The failure to 
sufficiently examine the disease or problem has led to a false assumption that the problem is 
certainly curable. Yet, not everything is curable or solvable as, in the words of Morgenthau, “Politics 
is an art and not a science.”2 
  
The Desirability and Possibility of Political Neutrality  
 This thesis has also raised doubts as to whether political neutrality in the UNSC is a desirable 
outcome, and secondly whether it is even possible. The question of whether political neutrality is 
desirable can be answered by addressing the two flawed premises on which veto restraint advocates 
base their assumptions on, namely that intervention necessarily saves more lives than non-
intervention, and that restraint of the veto is, in itself, an impartial action. 
 Firstly, proponents of veto restraint and the RtoP fail to consider the uncertainty 
surrounding intervention and the inevitable unintentional consequences that make it impossible to 
ascertain whether a course of action is the most responsible. In some situations, it may arguably be 
more responsible to exercise the veto. For instance, in a situation that involves an ill-thought-out 
resolution, is the use of the veto not a more responsible action, resulting in a more responsible 
outcome for the UNSC? In these situations, the veto may actually serve as an instrument to 
constrain the coercive and exploitative powers of individual P5 members. As Patrick argues, “the 
unwillingness of the Security Council to act in Syria could be interpreted not as evidence of its 
failure, but of its working as intended, by preventing coercion from being authorized contrary to the 
perceived interests of one (or more) permanent member.”3  Here, veto restraint (or impartiality, 
depending on one’s perspective) may not be a desirable feature of a responsible UNSC at all.  As 
Churkin stated on 2 September 2015, at the beginning of Russia’s UNSC presidency, the veto is “a 
tool which allows the Security Council to produce balanced decisions” and that “sometimes the 
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absence of veto can produce disaster.”4  But again, the uncertainty surrounding intervention makes 
it impossible to undeniably ascertain the most responsible decision.  As Morgenthau has cautioned, 
actions which seemingly attempt to create a more peaceful world system often fail to take into 
account the uncertainty which is inherent in international politics: “how often have statesmen been 
motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended up making it worse? And how often have 
they sought one goal, and ended up achieving something they neither expected, nor desired?” 5 
 Secondly, veto restraint not does necessarily equate to impartiality. An affirmative vote may 
actually be primarily serving self-interest, rather than a principled desire to maintain international 
peace and security. Both the use of the veto and the non-use of the veto are inherently political 
actions. In both cases, actions are firstly based upon considerations of national self-interest. Because 
of this, concerns have been raised that “the restrain the veto could be hijacked by countries seeking 
to intervene for ulterior motives under the cloak of RtoP.”6  This was arguably the case in the 2011 
Libyan intervention. In this instance, the P5 perceived that it was in their national interest to refrain 
from exercising the veto and framed their justification for sanctioning the Libyan intervention within 
the RtoP context. For an example, as previously discussed, China’s non-use of the veto was, in part, 
owed to the desire to maintain its alliance with Saudi Arabia. This demonstrates just one example of 
how deciding to not use the veto is just as much of a political decision as wielding the veto, and the 
difficulty of assessing the ‘impartiality’ of that action. 
 As previously mentioned, there had been a reluctance to call the situation in Libya a civil 
war.7 If it had been deemed so, UNSC intervention would have been perceived as a breach of Libya’s 
sovereignty and a violation of the UN Charter. However, politicians refrained from using the term 
and the situation was portrayed as conflict with an obvious aggressor and a population that required 
saving, as opposed to a civil war where both belligerents committed violent and unjust action. Here, 
there was a clear friend (the Libyan population, including the rebels) that required saving from a 
clear enemy (the Qaddafi regime). This friend/enemy dichotomy is required for the validity of the 
RtoP doctrine as it requires the need to protect against something, namely an enemy. This means 
that the doctrine relies on the political, because deciding who is a friend and who is an enemy are 
inherently political decisions, therefore framing intervention within the RtoP context, in reality, does 
not accommodate for impartial action. From this, it could be concluded that in some situations it 
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may appear that being seen to be impartial is desirable while, in others not and therefore the 
question of whether impartiality is desirable within a UNSC context is inconclusive. 
 
 The final question which this thesis has sought to address is whether UNSC impartiality is 
even possible. The possibility of this is dependent on the capacity of all individual P5 members’ to 
cast aside national self-interest as the primary motivation when deciding how to act in situations 
where there has been a breach in international peace and security. It is clear, however, that any 
rudimentary examination of the history of military intervention demonstrates that this is not 
possible. It is difficult to foresee a future where an assessment of national self-interest will not be 
the primary decision-making factor for states.  Despite RtoP proponents’ effusive language, such as 
that of Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss describing it as the “most dramatic normative 
development of our time,”8 the doctrine has not resulted in a demonstrable change in the inherent 
disposition of states. As a result, it is difficult to believe that the veto restraint proposals will similarly 
produce any different behaviour.  
 The history of the RtoP demonstrates the limits of moral advocacy, which is reminiscent of 
Carr’s assertion that power of public opinion is a broken reed. This limit is currently evident in the 
current inaction in Syria despite countless pleas for action from the ‘international community.’  As 
the RtoP has demonstrated, there is a difference between the declared discourse of states, and 
actual state action. RtoP, in this sense, has not changed state behaviour.  Even if the elements of the 
proposed reforms were successfully enacted, what could actually prevent the P5 from circumventing 
veto restraint? As Hehir has stated, “the notion that we can find the right combination of words to 
change the disposition of states is illusionary.”9   
 Despite the adoption of the RtoP doctrine, the Council continues to hold a discretionary 
entitlement to act, so therefore receives no direct punishment if it decides to not implement the 
RtoP in cases where there appears to be a strong case to do so. This makes it difficult to believe that 
the proposed reforms will change the inherent disposition of states, especially considering that the 
national interest clause gives the P5 a direct ‘out’ as virtually anything could be argued to be in the 
national interest.  The fact of the matter is that there is no overarching presence in the current 
international system which has the power and authority to dictate terms and conditions over the P5 
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members. Nothing in the current reform proposals seeks to address this, and as a result it is difficult 
to see how the initiatives will ever limit or change the decision making power of the UNSC.  
A way forward? 
  This research has identified the impossibility of political neutrality which is due to the 
primacy of national self-interest which drives state behaviour. It is therefore prudent to begin with 
this premise when considering further research on UN reform.  In terms of veto restraint (and 
assuming that it is desirable) it is important to consider what factors are required for such a proposal 
to be enforced. This is crucial because what the current proposals lack are incentives for compliance, 
and incentives are required because states will act foremost based upon their self-interests.  Given 
this, as states have everything to gain by acting in their self-interests, the only motivating factor for 
veto restraint compliance would have to involve the fear or cost of punishment for noncompliance. 
This suggests that in order for veto restraint to become a possibility the world order would require 
an overarching independent international authority that has the capacity to enforce international 
law.  Further research could explore this idea.   
 Yet, even a cursory examination of the idea of an independent international authority as a 
possibility seems highly difficult to achieve, if not impossible, considering the significant implications 
it would have for sovereignty, authority, and the balance of power.  In addition, the possibility of an 
independent international authority has further implications for political neutrality; such an 
institution would inevitably have to pick sides in a conflict situation, whether it is, for example, the 
side of the government, the rebels, or to gain their own control over a disputed territory.  While it 
could be argued that such an authority could seek to enforce a ceasefire with the aim of establishing 
a negotiated settlement, the counter argument to that is that the demand and expectation of action 
from such an authority cannot result in anything other than problematic uses of force, such as 
‘neutral’ no-fly zones, and the dangerous principles and precedents. In addition, settling internal 
conflicts requires a decision-making authority, yet there is no reason to believe that those decisions 
can be better handled by external actors, rather than an internal power, as there are always 
ambiguities and moral problems arising from civil war situations, which ultimately have implications 
for relativism and moral universalism.  
 Possible questions for future research could include the current reasons for the absence of 
such a body and the possible costs of its emergence. There are enduring structural and political 
problems, all revolving around questions of sovereignty and decision-making that will always be tied 
to any use of force for any purposes. Further research into this area may discover that this approach 





whom?) for the legal resolution of violent political conflicts and will generate similar issues 
experienced in the contemporary international arena.  
 
 This thesis has set out to explore the challenge of political neutrality in the United Nations 
Security Council. It has found that political neutrality, within the context of the UNSC, is impossible 
to achieve in the current political environment.  The proposed reforms do not sufficiently recognise 
the self-interests and lust for power that drives state behaviour, nor do they recognise the 
inherently political nature of crisis situations, such as the ongoing conflict in Syria and its 
neighbouring states. By failing to adequately address the political drivers of state behaviour, the 
proposed reforms are incapable of transcending the politics of the UNSC. This is due to the fact that 
the UNSC is the only authority which can sanction legitimate military intervention, which means the 
inevitability of political input. The UNSC’s use of its Chapter VII powers has been erratic and 
dependent on the assent of each member of the P5, and this will continue to be the case so long as 
there remains no overarching independent international enforcement authority. The UNSC does not 
work towards actually acting impartially as the case of the 2011 Libyan crisis demonstrated. Instead, 
it moulds, manipulates, and frames a situation so it at least appears to be acting so, while hiding 
behind the discourse of the political itself. By presenting a mass atrocity situation as either a 
romanticised story of an evildoer inflicting violence upon a population in distress (friend/enemy 
dichotomy), or as a civil war, the decision will determine what the accepted response will be. In 
order for the UN’s adopted RtoP doctrine to be applied, the former framing of a crisis situation is 
required. This renders political neutrality as an impossible achievement as deciding who is a friend 
and who is an enemy are inherently political decisions.  This thesis has found that the current 
expectations of  any reform of the UNSC are in need of reconsideration, and that the limitations of 
political neutrality need to be addressed and acknowledged in order for the institution to hold any 
credibility. Particularly, its inability to act impartially needs to be properly appreciated. The flawed 
idea that it acts impartially, or that it is even possible for it to do so, only results in a heightened 
expectation of what it can achieve, and instead what is required is the acceptance that it is 
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